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Abstract
As part of the pollution control effort several developing countries have established
economic-based initiatives to improve environmental quality. In this study the Colom-
bian water pollution charge, which was implemented in 1997, is analyzed. The two
key questions that this study attempts to answer are: 1) Does the performance of
the pollution charge program in Colombia undermine the notion that economic in-
struments are not feasible in developing countries? 2) Which factors determine the
performance of the water pollution charge program across regional environmental
agencies in Colombia?
The answer to these questions provides valuable information for developing coun-
tries looking for more efficient and optimal ways to approach pollution control. These
questions are answered through the analysis of data from the first five years of the pro-
gram’s implementation (1997-2002). The data sample is composed of 255 polluters in
three representative environmental agencies: cornare, coralina and codechoco.
The findings suggest that the success of the Colombian case contradicts the eco-
nomic theory notion that economic instruments are unfeasible in developing countries.
Even though, the water pollution program was not successful across all regional en-
vironmental agencies in Colombia, there are regional environmental agencies where
the program was successful in reducing pollution levels. This success is related to the
overcoming of the unfavorable circumstances by such agencies.
ii
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It was also found that the factors that seem to explain the differences in the per-
formance of water pollution charge program across national environmental agencies
are related to social, economic and institutional aspects, such as: economic subac-
tivity, percent amount collected by the environmental agency, basin group, program
cost, GDP, min rate, fee invoiced, percent amount collected and basin group.
It is suggested that the economic theory can be reconciliated with the findings
of this study by qualifying the different regional environmental agencies in Colombia
as “developed” and “developing”. It can be said that “developing” agencies present
unfavorable circumstances that limit their effectiveness for the application of economic
instruments.
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Introduction
A challenge faced by developing countries is finding ways to develop economically and
at the same time maintain adequate environmental quality. As part of the pollution
control effort several developing countries have established economic-based initiatives
to improve environmental quality. In this study the colombian water pollution charge
is analyzed. The water pollution charge in Colombia, offers an opportunity to learn
efficient and optimal ways to approach the environmental problems in developing
countries.
The belief that developing countries cannot afford high levels of environmental
quality because it will mean lower monetary incomes and lessened capacity to sup-
port their populations, is probably the most frequently point of view mentioned by
scholars (Field, 2002:416). From this point of view, developing countries perceive the
concern for the environmental quality and sustainability as a burden, additional to
their struggle to escape from poverty and meet higher economic standards.
Another point of view on this matter is that the environment and economic growth
are not so much substitutes as they are complements (Field, 2002:417). Development
and environmental degradation are reciprocally related because productivity depends
on natural resources condition. Present and future generations depend of natural
resources to maintain the economic productivity. Therefore not only the economic
production will have an impact on the environment but also environmental degrada-
1
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tion will have a negative impact on the economic productivity.
To find best public policies to use under the circumstances of developing coun-
tries is a challenge for policymakers. In developing countries, there are several eco-
nomic, social and political conditions considered to be significant impediments for
better environmental management and, particularly, for implementation of economic
mechanisms to control pollution. These conditions are related to the lack of human
and institutional capital (e.g. corruption, institutional capacity, tightness of budget,
among others).
Despite this situation, Latin American countries have been increasing their in-
terest in reducing pollution during the last decades and thus the interest of using
economic instruments towards reducing pollution levels. Colombia is one of the coun-
tries that has implemented economic mechanisms, aiming at a more efficient pollution
control. As part of the pollution control effort, in 1997 the pollution charge system
was implemented in Colombia. This program has been catalogued by several schol-
ars, policy makers and organizations as a successful program reducing water pollution
levels.
In this study the colombian water pollution charge is analyzed. This analysis is
framed in two questions:
First, does the performance of the pollution charge program in Colombia under-
mine the notion that economic instruments are not feasible in developing countries?
this question is answered in order to make a contribution to the debate over the
effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of economic instruments in developing countries
because of the lack of institutional and human capital.
Second, this study aims to respond to the question -Which factors determine the
performance of the water pollution charge program across regional environmental
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agencies in Colombia? In particular, this study looks to address and analyze the
differences in the outcomes during the first five years (1997-2002) of program imple-
mentation by the regional agencies.
This work is presented in four chapters. In Chapter I, the theory of mechanisms to
control pollution is reviewed. Two of the most common mechanisms to control pollu-
tion -command and control and market based- are presented. Chapter I also presents
a literature review about market based mechanisms to control water pollution in de-
veloping countries. In chapter II, the antecedents, legal foundation, implementation
and results of the water pollution program in Colombia is explained. In Chapter III,
the research analysis an results are presented. Finally, in chapter IV, conclusions and
policy-making recommendations are offered. These policy recommendations aim to
help the design and implementation of future economic instruments, in particular for
water pollution programs in developing countries.
Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.1 Approaches to Environmental Pollution Reg-
ulation
The environmental regulation has different approaches including command-and- con-
trol regulation; economic-based instruments; moral suasion and government produc-
tion or expenditure. In table 1.1 a summary of the different approaches are presented.
This study focuses attention upon the command-and-control and economic-based ap-
proaches.
Command and control or direct controls modes of regulation have been the tra-
ditional approach. They have been dominant in environmental protection programs,
and only until early 1970s did legislators and regulators begin to use marketplace
and other incentive-based approaches in environmental regulation. Since then, and
particularly over the past two decades, the economic incentives have emerged as a
significant trend in regulation worldwide, first in industrialized countries and later on
in developing ones (NAPA, 1994:1), (Stavins and Whitehead, 1996:1) and (Acquatella
and Ba´rcena, 2005:27).
Some reasons for this change in trend are related to the limitations in the command-
and-control approach to achieve the goals of environmental quality improvement
NAPA (1994:1) and Gunningham, Sinclair, and Grabosky (1998:68). These limi-
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tations can be detected in the fact that the employment of this approach is often
administratively complex and costly. Also, this approach may hold back technolog-
ical innovation in cases when it is used over a long period of time (NAPA, 1994:1).
Additionally, this change in trend is explained by the attractiveness of economic in-
struments as policy instrument in both theory and practice (Stavins and Whitehead,
1996:1). For instance, their flexibility and possibility of funding for environmental
programs allow countries to control pollution while generating economic resources to
finance programs driven to improve the quality of the environment.
Table 1.1: Policy Instruments to Reduce Pollution
Policies Instruments
Market-based incentives Effluent charges; tradable permits; de-
posit reform systems; input/output taxes
and subsidies; subsidies for substitutes and
abatement inputs.
Command and control measures Emission regulations (source specific, non-
transferable quotas); regulation of equip-
ment, processes, inputs, and outputs.
Moral suasion/voluntary compli-
ance
publicity; social pressure.
Government production or expen-
diture
Regulatory agency expenditures for purifi-
cation, cleanup, waste disposal, and en-
forcement; regenerative activities; educa-
tion and research; development of clean
technologies
Sources: Eskeland and Jimenez (1992); Baumol and Oates (1975); Tietenberg (1990);
Baumol and Oates (1979)
From the list of policy instruments presented in Table 1.1 the best option for envi-
ronmental policy depends on the particular pollution activity and the environmental
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circumstances. As Gunningham et al. (1998:35) demonstrate, each category of policy
instruments for regulation control has something valuable and at the same time they
have substantial limitations as a ’stand alone’ strategy. The authors suggest that
no single instrument works well across the board and that their success depends on
interests and opportunities of key players and the relation among those players.
Other authors such as Baumol and Oates (1975:125) share a similar position
expressing that the optimal policy package will include a combination of many of those
policy approaches. Furthermore, Baumol and Oates state that the policy instruments
for pollution control are not all mutually exclusive and that it is possible to use a
combination of them to control pollution. Further they note:
“There is no panacea, no one simple approach, that is always best (or
even always workable), and that is why the design of environmental policy
requires such extensive analysis. ” (Baumol and Oates, 1979:229)
1.1.1 Command and Control Approach
Command and control policies are traditional regulatory approaches where regulators
’command’ polluting firms to ’control’ their pollution by specifying what they should
do - referring to quantity of pollution - and how they should do it, in other words, by
setting an environmental target (NAPA, 1994:6).
As Stavins (2000) explains, in general, command and control regulations force
firms to shoulder identical shares of the pollution-control burden, regardless of the
relative costs to them of this burden. The regulator sets uniform standards for firms
to achieve specific environmental goals. These standards include: ambient standards;
technology-based performance standards; design standards; environmental manage-
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ment standards and product standards (Gunningham et al., 1998:40).
As noted by Stavins and Whitehead (1996) and Stavins (2000), the most prevalent
are technology-based and performance-based standards. Technology-based standards
specify the method, and sometimes the actual equipment, that firms must use to
comply with a particular regulation. For example, all electric utilities might be re-
quired to employ a specific type of scrubber to remove particles. On the other hand,
a performance standard sets a uniform control target for firms, while allowing some
flexibility in how this target is met. For example, a regulation might limit the number
of allowable units of a pollutant released in a given time period, but might not dictate
the means by which this goal is achieved.
Command and control approach exposes limitations in the achievement of long
established environmental goals1. These limitations are related to: complexity; costs;
and holding back technological innovation.
• The command and control approach is complex. Using command and control
mechanisms to control pollution, the regulator needs information and data to
design and develop effective standards. The process of getting this data is long
and expensive. Also this process is, as pointed by NAPA (1994), inherently
uncertain because the private sector is unenthusiastic about collecting data
on control cost. Additionally, command and control schemes require detailed
knowledge of industrial processes and polluting activities. The sheer enormity or
quantity of environmental statutes and associated regulations in industrialized
countries makes it difficult for all the actors in the control process to comply
with all obligations.
1For success and failure examples in the United States refer to Traditional Regulatory Approach
in The environment Goes to Market NAPA (1994); Economic Instruments for Environmental Reg-
ulationTietenberg (1990) and Instruments for Environmental Protection Gunningham et al. (1998)
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• The command and control approach is costly. Holding all firms to the same
target can be expensive and, in some circumstances, counterproductive. In
situations with many heterogenous polluters, such as a large informal sector, and
weak public administration this kind of approach does not work well. There is a
high difficulty to estimate individual abatement cost by the regulator (Eskeland
and Jimenez, 1992:149). Also, as the NAPA (1994)work notes, because the costs
of controlling emissions may vary greatly between firms, and even within the
same firm, the appropriate technology in one situation may be inappropriate
in another. Tietenberg (1990) addresses some empirical examples that show
that the excess cost are typically very large compared with those in economic
instrument even though, as he says, those examples overstate the cost saving
that could be present in an ideal economic instrument.
• Command and control regulations tend to freeze the development of technolo-
gies. They allow little flexibility in the means of achieving goals because the
standards discourage exploration of new technologies and at the same time little
or no financial incentive exists for businesses to exceed their control targets. As
Stavins and Whitehead (1996:5) explain:
“A business experimenting with a new technology may be re-
warded by being held to a higher standard of performance, but is
not given the opportunity to benefit financially from its investment,
except to the extent its competitors have even more difficulty reaching
the new standard.”
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1.1.2 Economic Instruments for Pollution Control
Market-based instruments are regulations that encourage behavior through price sig-
nals rather than through explicit instructions on pollution control levels or methods
(Stavins, 2000:31). Furthermore, those instruments refer to laws, rules and proce-
dures with explicit environmental objectives designed to produce signals directed to
economic agents, reflected in changes of relative prices of inputs and/or products,
affecting their costs and those processes, which they intervene.
The World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP) in their Guide to the Use of Water Quality Management Principles
(1997) state that economic or market-based instruments rely on market forces and
changes in relative prices to modify the behavior of public and private polluters in a
way that supports environmental protection or improvement. Then, the basic pur-
pose of those instruments is to influence costs and benefits and the profitability of
alternative processes or technologies, as well as the relative prices of products, raw
materials, or other inputs in order to induce economic agents to take environmentally
sound decisions and contribute to reduce overall levels of environmental deterioration
(UNEP, 2001).
Economic instruments work indirectly as instruments for environmental control
influencing decisions of firms and households. They can be designed to be comple-
mentary to other instruments with similar goals as command and control or as direct
agreements to reduce emissions with the industry. These policy instruments are de-
scribed by, WHO/UNEP (1997) as “harnessing market forces” because if they are
properly implemented, they encourage firms, through economic incentives, to under-
take pollution control efforts that are both in their financial self-interest and that will
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collectively meet policy goals.
In table 1.2 a list of the most significant categories of economic instruments is
presented. This list is and adaptation of the categories identified in the revised liter-
ature, particularly of the economic instrument categories presented by Gunningham
et al. (1998); Rietbergen-McCracken and Abaza (2000) and Panayotou (1998).
Table 1.2: Economic Incentives for Pollution control
Category Instruments
Property and user rights Property, tenure, concessions.
Market creation Water markets, tradable permits, insurance.
Fiscal instruments Pollution taxes, input taxes, import tariffs, financial
aid in stalling new technology, subsides for environ-
mental research.
Charge systems Effluent charges, user charges, product charges, im-
pact fees, access fees.
Financial instruments Financial subsidies, reimbursement systems, com-
pliance incentives, soft loans and grants, secto-
rial/revolving funds.
Liability instruments Liability insurance legislation
Deposit refund system Deposit-refund schemes to encourage recycling, envi-
ronmental performance bonds.
Sources: Rietbergen-McCracken and Abaza (2000); Panayotou (1998); Gunningham
et al. (1998)
Economic instruments have practical strengths as well as weaknesses. Both have
been demonstrated in both developed and developing countries, through several stud-
ies such as the UNEP (2002) case studies. When properly applied, economic instru-
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ments have a number of advantages when compared to command-and-control instru-
ments, some of those advantages refer to:
• The economic approach allows more flexibility in how the environmental goal
is reached. Economic mechanisms impose a cost on pollution-causing activities
leaving it to individual firms to decide for themselves how to achieve the required
level of environmental quality. In this way, the individual agents can use their
information to select the best means of meeting an emission reduction level
(Gunningham et al., 1998).
• Economic mechanisms are cost-effective. As NAPA (1994:11) points out,
these mechanisms have the potential to make pollution control economically
advantageous to commercial organizations and to lower pollution abatement
costs. They can reduce pollution at less cost than traditional regulatory means,
they are driven to find the level where the polluter pays the exact price for the
pollution valued on the basis of its damage to others. In other words, economic
mechanisms provide incentives for the use of cost effective ways of attaining the
desired levels of emissions; their rationale of direct price/cost signals encourage
decision makers to determine what action is best. Furthermore, as noted by
NAPA (1994:10):
“the totality of the individual responses should result in a reduc-
tion in pollution at a cost that is lower than the alternative, since
only those polluters that find it cheaper to do so so will undertake
abatement.”
Another aspect of cost-effectiveness of economic instruments is described by
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Stavins (2000:33): Market-based instruments require fewer total economic re-
sources to achieve the same level of pollution control, compared with command-
and-control approach, because rather than equalizing pollution levels among
firms (as with uniform-pollution standards), market-based instruments equalize
the incremental amount that firms spend to reduce pollution, i. e marginal cost.
• They incentive the development of pollution control technology. The economic
instruments create dynamic incentives for investments to innovate and contin-
ually improve environmental technology, generating both environmental and
financial benefits (“win-win”)UNEP (2002).
“Under command and control approach technological changes dis-
covered by the control authority typically lead to more stringent stan-
dards (and higher costs) for the sources. Sources have little incentive
to innovate and good deal of incentive to hide potential innovations
from the control authority. With emission trading, on the other hand,
innovations allowing excess reductions create saleable emission cred-
its.” (Tietenberg, 1990:28)
• Economic instruments provide the government with a source of revenues that
can be used for pollution control programmes. Moreover, they allow the substi-
tution of traditional ways to raise revenue (Tietenberg, 1990:p 23) , decreasing
distortions of resource allocation and inefficiency created by this aspect.
• Economic Instruments can be applied to a wide range of environmental problems.
They can involve varying degrees of incentives, information, and administrative
capacity for effective implementation and enforcement.
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• Economic Instruments offer an opportunity to overcome the barriers of lack of
information. Economic incentive approaches offer a unique opportunity for
regulators to solve the fundamental dilemma that they have to face with lack of
sufficient information to allocate the responsibility for control cost-effectively.
Tietenberg (1990:21) points out that, economic instruments create a system of
incentives in which those who have the best knowledge about control opportu-
nities, the environmental managers for the industry, are encouraged to use that
knowledge to achieve environmental objectives at minimum cost.
Also, because the economic instruments eliminate the requirements for detailed
information on each individual source, the barriers of lack of information are
easier to overcome, given that the amount of individual information required
will be smaller. This aspect will also contribute to lower the administrative
complexity.
On the other hand, economic instruments also have disadvantages. One of them
is addressed by Stavins and Whitehead (1996), who argue that the actual effects over
the environmental quality cannot be as precisely predicted as with the command and
control approach since each source has more flexibility in defining its own solution.
Another disadvantage is noted by Gunningham et al. (1998). The authors note
that economic instruments are not self-enforcing and may involve considerable control
cost. The authors point out that one recent study concluded that there is no reason to
expect administrative costs to be generally lower than those of regulatory instruments.
In this respect, the statement of Huber, Ruttenbeek, and Motta (1999) gives some
clarity. According to the author, administration cost associated with economic in-
struments may be higher, given that monitoring requirements and other enforcement
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activities remain as command-and-control mechanisms, and additional administra-
tion efforts may be required to cope with the design and institutional changes arising
from the introduction of economic instruments.
1.1.3 Water Pollution Charges
As defined by UNEP (2001), the charge is a monetary expression of the environmental
damages that are perceived from the community. The charge or tax can be defined as
a “price” to be paid on the use of the environment. Pollution charge systems assess a
fee or a tax based on the amount of pollution that a company generates rather than
simply charging based on its pollution-generating activities. (UNEP, 2001)
Consequently, it is worthwhile for a company to reduce pollution to the point at
which its marginal cost of control is equal to the pollution-tax rate. By internalizing
the previously external pollution costs, firms will control pollution to differing degrees,
with high-cost controllers controlling less, and low-cost controllers controlling more.
Baumol and Oates (1975:102) have shown that, assuming cost-minimization behavior
by producers, effluent charges are the least-cost method of achieving the target.
On the other hand, the regulator confronts the challenge of setting the tax amount.
As Stavins andWhitehead (1996:10) suggest, ideally the tax level will be where the tax
equals the benefits of a cleanup. However, policy makers have a difficult time knowing
beforehand how firms will respond to a given level of taxation, so it is difficult to know
with precision what level of cleanup will result from any given charge. The regulator
faces the dilemma of setting a low or high fee, if the fee is low the environmental
quality will not improve, since the improvement in many cases depends on the level
at which the effluent charge rate is set.
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The rule for determining environmental goals and pollution charges, is described
by the World-Bank (2000). This rule is to find the point where the Marginal Abate-
ment Costs equals the Marginal Social Damage for water pollution (MAC = MSD).
At this point, neither increasing nor decreasing pollution will improve social welfare.
This “golden rule” provides a good framework, in the real world the actual levels
are determined through the political process. Concrete information about lives lost,
fisheries destroyed, and other damage can play some role, but it will never be the sole
determining factor. Policymakers have to seek consensus on environmental goals and
then use the available regulatory instruments to pursue them.
The four main types of charges used for controlling pollution are:
1. Effluent charges. Charges which are based on the quantity and/or quality of
the discharged pollutants.
2. User charges. Fees paid for the use of collective treatment facilities.
3. Product charges. Charges levied on products that are harmful to the environ-
ment when used as an input to the production process, consumed, or disposed
4. Administrative charges. Fees paid to authorities for such purposes as chemical
registration or financing licensing and pollution control activities.
Tietenberg (1990:429) notes that economists typically consider two types of ef-
fluent charges. First, an efficiency charge, designed to produce an efficient outcome
by, as explained in the Section 1.1.2, forcing the polluter to pay or compensate for
the damages caused. Second, a cost-effective charge driven to achieve a predefined
ambient standard at the possible control cost. The author states that in practice few
implemented programmes fit either of those two designs.
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As Sterner (2003) notes, even though taxes and charges are used interchangeably,
they have some differences. Taxes are usually used for political purposes rather than
as administratively decided fees. Another difference is that taxes typically go to the
treasury rather than being earmarked for local or sectorial use. As the author de-
scribes, many politicians have encountered considerable resistance to environmental
taxes because in many countries money that goes to the central treasury is perceived
as being lost. On the other hand, a charge system is more accepted because money
stays within the sector or region. The revenue from charges is typically earmarked for
specific environmental purposes rather than contributed to the general revenue as a
means of reducing the reliance on taxes that produce more distortions in resource allo-
cation (Tietenberg, 1990:p 430). Furthermore, some authors such as Arjona, Molina,
Castro, Castillo, and Arbelaez (2000) claim that the best results in the implementa-
tion of water pollution programs comes from the programs where the revenues from
the charge system stay in the region to be invested with similar environmental and
economic interests.
Emissions charges have been used by several countries to control both air and
water pollution. In this study I will focus on the use of those charges to control water
pollution. Examples of the use of economic instruments for this purpose can be found
in France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Holland, Japan, Chile, Mexico,
Costa Rica, among other countries. 2
The literature on the advantages of discharge fees focuses on their efficiency, flex-
ibility, and revenue (Sterner, 2003) and (Blackman, 2005). These advantages were
discussed in Section 1.1.2 and the same analysis applies for water pollution charges.
2See Tietenberg (1990); Hahn (1989); Arjona et al. (2000) for details of the emissions charges in
those countries.
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Various case studies highlight evidence that suggests that effluent charges can be
effective in reducing levels of waste emissions. Some of those cases are described
by Baumol and Oates (1979). Among those examples are West Germany and the
United States: the control of pollution in the Ruhr Valley is a German successful
case of treating pollution.
There is also literature addressing common problems in implementing discharge
fee systems in developing and countries in transition. Overall these case studies show
that the effluent charges can be reasonably effective to improve water quality. How-
ever, it is necessary to set the rate at a sufficiently high level so that it becomes
an effective incentive for abatement. A literature review addressing the character-
istics and challenges confronted by developing countries and countries in transition
in implementing economic instruments and, particularly, water pollution charges is
presented in Section 1.2.
In developing countries many social, economic and political factors are distinc-
tively different from those in developed countries. These factors define the priorities
in policy making. For instance, in developing countries, the creation of employment
and income opportunities can be a factor defining the policy making agenda within
a country. Arjona et al. (2000) says, in developing countries the opportunity cost
of capital is too high - the financial resources have to guarantee the development of
health, education, infrastructure, and of other socio-economic variables. The envi-
ronment and the environmental challenges, thus, may not gain the attention they
need.
Despite this hypothesis that developing countries are not interested in pollution
control (Sterner, 2003) and that command-and-control is still the dominant trend in
most developing countries. Field (2002) says that the use of economic instruments
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is at the top of the agenda of the environmental management sector in an increasing
number of developing countries and emerging economies all over the world (UNEP,
2001:5.41). For instance figure 1.1 shows Latin American and Caribbean countries
that are using different market base instruments for environmental policymaking.
Figure 1.1: Application of Economic Instruments in Latin American and Caribbean
Countries
Source: Da Motta et al. (1999)
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1.2 Economic Instruments in Developing Countries
Before the mid 90s, there was little documentation of experiences with economic
mechanisms in developing countries. As noted by Eskeland and Jimenez (1992:145)
there were no rigorous studies of pollution control in developing countries, but there
was a convincing casual evidence that environmental regulations were badly designed
or enforced. Rietbergen-McCracken and Abaza (2000) also identify a similar prob-
lem, but as they note this trend has been changing with collaborative works by
several researchers in a wide range of developing countries and countries in transition
(CITs). Also, with the help of some international organizations, such as the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) the documentation became more prevalent. In this regard, regional
and national organizations have also been taking a role. Such as the case of Latin
America, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) that have been leading the research in
economic mechanisms. Examples of studies on economic mechanisms, conducted in
developing countries, are presented below.
UNEP has conducted numerous country studies on economic instruments. For
example in 2002 the UNEP (2002) published case studies conducted in Philippines,
Kenya, Chile, Uganda, Bangladesh and Mauritania. These studies are undertaken
by policy research institutes familiar with local conditions and priorities involving
a broad range of stake holders, including relevant government ministries. This ap-
proach ensures that results are founded on reliable national data and realistic policy
recommendations.
Rietbergen-McCracken and Abaza (2000) presents an extensive analysis of eco-
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nomic incentives for pollution control in developing countries. This work is a com-
pendium of the lessons learned in the developing countries that have implemented eco-
nomic instruments for pollution control. The authors recognize that the economic,
social and political conditions, of developing countries and countries in transition
worldwide, strongly influence the way in which these instruments can be used. The
authors found that the majority of cases deal with some form of environmental tax
or charge.
The the growing number of case studies about the experience from developing
countries offer policymakers a comprehensive view of challenges and legacies they have
in order to use environmental policymaking to improve environmental quality and
welfare (e.g. the compilation of studies by da Motta (2001)) by highlighting a number
of common problems implementing market base mechanism to control pollution in
developing countries.
The common problems in developing countries are characterized by some unfavor-
able circumstances, confronted by policymakers, that make the effective application
of economic instruments limited. These weaknesses are the consequences not only of
lack of economic strength and capital input, but also of scientific and technological
backwardness and the dearth of human resources. Some of the unfavorable circum-
stances or limitations are exposed by WHO/UNEP (1997); Blackman (2005) and
Eskeland and Jimenez (1992). The compilation elements/constrains for the effective
application of most economic instruments in developing countries are:
1. Weak institutional capacity : Economic instruments cannot be implemented suc-
cessfully without pre-existing appropriate standards and effective administra-
tive, monitoring, and enforcement capacities. Moreover, there is little difference,
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if any, in the monitoring and enforcement capability required of government for
regulatory and economic instruments. If there is uncertain monitoring and
weak enforcement, there is little or no reason for an organization to report its
discharges and pay a fee.
The institutional weakness also is related to under-funding, inexperience, un-
clear jurisdiction and lack of political will. Institutional strengthening involves
improving the legal and regulatory framework to ensure sustainable manage-
ment of water resources and the protection of aquatic ecosystems. Thus, the
organizational strengthening involves improving the capacity of the groups of
people in administrative or functional structures to apply the regulatory frame-
work and the administration of the implementation tools.
Russell (2001:343) describe three areas of institutional capacity that determine
the success of implementation of economic instruments, since those demand
high levels of institutional capacity, which is likely to be the scarcest resource in
developing countries Russell (2001:356). First, do the necessary laws exist? For
example , do laws cover the forms of pollution discharge and renewable resource
damage that are to be policy targets? Do those laws make the connection
between development projects and the environment? Second, how unified is the
structure that will turn the laws into specific economic incentives? Will those
laws be enforced? A minimal promising structure would seem to be one in which
there is a pollution control agency, with full sectorial and geographic coverage; a
natural resource management agency; and some sort of coordinating body that
brings these agencies together with the development planning agency. Third,
do the agencies have the skilled people available to implement the laws? This
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could include lawyers who write regulations or technical specialist in the field,
for example.
The institutional capability is very important to implement and operate eco-
nomic instruments. As noted by NAPA (1994), the institutional design, staffing,
and culture needed to implement and administer economic instruments is dif-
ferent from those of command and control. Staff with a disciplinary mix may
be appropriate for the success of the programs.
2. Inadequate co-ordination: Institutional co-ordination is an important prereq-
uisite for the effective application of most economic instruments. In the case
of water management, however, there is often a traditional rivalry between
the environmental and water and sanitation agencies. This may be due to a
number of reasons such as political power and differing goals and perspectives.
Nonetheless, the structure of an effluent charge system involves parameters and
information that are more in the domain of the environmental agencies, while
the implementation of the system is largely the responsibility of the water and
sanitation companies. Unless the relevant agencies are well coordinated, the
application of effluent charges will be undermined (Margulis, 1994).
3. Economic instability: Economic stability is critical for the effectiveness of eco-
nomic instruments. Although regulatory instruments probably depend less on
the level of economic stability in a country, charges and taxes are highly de-
pendent on it. In addition, capital and credit market are characterized by risk,
uncertainty and in developing countries, making it difficult to borrow money to
finance abatement, for example.
4. Government resistance or inertia: In some countries, there is a general per-
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ception by environmental agencies that the use of economic instruments will
not only weaken their control over polluters, but that they will have to share
their control with economic ministries, who are usually responsible for creating
new taxes or charges. The application of economic instruments, therefore, is
likely to make environmental agencies even weaker than they already are in
most countries. Moreover, the results in terms of pollution levels would be
less certain. In other countries, where regulators have relied on standards, in-
spections and penalties for managing pollution, there is a reluctance to try a
new approach unless it is clearly demonstrated to be better than the existing
regulatory system.
5. Resistance by polluters: In developed countries, as in industrial ones, industrial
polluters often have resisted economic instruments because they believe that
they have greater negotiating power over the design and implementation of
regulations than they do over economic instruments. Moreover, local industries
rightly assume that it is easier to avoid compliance with a standard where there
is poor monitoring and enforcement capacity, than to avoid fiscal and incentive
mechanisms where there is less flexibility.
6. Tightness of budget for environmental issues : Environmental control is too
costly, budgets are often tight and developing countries often concentrate on
other development priorities (Eskeland and Jimenez, 1992).
7. Lobbying by powerful interest groups, and limited public support and partici-
pation: If the environmental agency has little staff and other resources, the
monitoring equipment is expensive and staff are underqualified and underpaid,
then the risks of deceptive lobbing or even corruption are particularly high
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(Sterner, 2003:317).
8. Weak Environmental Regulatory Infrastructure: Blackman (2005) and Eske-
land and Jimenez (1992) describe how many of the developing and transitional
countries that have experimented with discharge fees lack the infrastructure
needed to set fees, monitor emissions and damages, invoice polluters, and col-
lect payment. This infrastructure includes reasonably capable environmental
regulatory, judicial, and legislative institutions and political support for enforc-
ing discharge fees. In addition, most agencies in developing countries have few
employees, who sometimes have little technical training and equipment as well
as limited legal authority (Sterner, 2003).
Eskeland and Jimenez (1992) argue that in practice, monitoring emissions and
damages at the source may be costly, so the emissions can only be imperfectly
monitored. As the authors comment this happens in industrialized countries,
such as the USA; as well as in developing countries where this situation can
be worse, since the regulatory agencies are weaker than those in the developed
countries. Also, in developing countries, the informal sector, composed of small
or home-based businesses, makes monitoring difficult. Sterner (2003).
9. Low Fee Levels : to maximize efficiency, economic theory dictates that discharge
fees are set at the level where marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal
environmental damages. In practice, however, developing countries have not
been able to follow this prescription because they lack requisite information
about pollution abatement and environmental damage functions. Probably just
as important, political pressure from water polluters limits their ability to set
substantive fees. Hence, in many countries, discharge fees have not been high
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enough to create incentives for pollution abatement and have mainly served as
a mean of raising revenue (Blackman, 2005:2).
10. Uncertainty : Eskeland and Jimenez (1992:158) note that the effects of environ-
mental policies may depend on events that are difficult to predict, and of which
there is little information in developing countries. For example, difficulty to
adjust by the polluters and population the health of the population may change
the effects of a particular policy such as air pollution.
11. Non Competitive Market Structure: The implementation of market-base mech-
anisms assume that markets are competitive; but it is not always the case. As
Eskeland and Jimenez (1992:160) indicate, in industrialize countries utilities
are examples of monopolies. On the other hand, in developing countries the
market failures are related to small markets, tariffs, high transportation cost
and limited access to credit.
These unfavorable circumstances that make the effective application of economic
instruments limited, had led to the notion that economic instruments are not feasible
in developing countries. At the same time, the increasing documentation from de-
veloping countries experiences with market base mechanisms, present evidence that
even though there are shortcomings between the environmental economy theory and
the practice, in some developing countries market-based mechanisms have generally
been successful in improving the environment.
For instance, China charges for pollution appears to be working satisfactorily.
China, whose principal source of energy is coal, has record air pollution in its cities. Its
rivers and streams are also badly polluted. This situation has been widely reported.
In this case China began testing a sulphur tax in nine towns and two provinces.
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With the programm atmospheric concentration of SO2 have fallen by 30 percent and
the frequency of acid rain precipitations has declined by 17 percent . The charge
system has also succeeded in gathering funds and allocating them for anti-pollution
investment. (Potier, 1995).
Also, the Colombian water pollution charge program has been pointed out as a
successful example where an economic instrument is effective reducing water pol-
lution, in studies conducted by organizations such as: the World-Bank (2000), the
Colombian government (Colombian Ministry of the Environment, 2002), the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean(ECLAC/CEPAL)
and The Andean Center for Economics in the Environment (CAEMA/ACEE) (2001).
The existence of unfavorable circumstances that make the effective application
of economic instruments limited in developing countries and the findings about the
success of market-based mechanisms in some developing countries, lead to the first
research question:
Does the performance of the pollution charge pro-
gram in Colombia undermine the notion that eco-
nomic instruments are not feasible in developing
countries?
Chapter 2
Water Pollution Charge Program
in Colombia
The Colombian case has been selected to evaluate the argument that the implementa-
tion of economic instruments presents difficulties in developing countries, as described
in section 1.2. Colombia is one developing countries that has implemented economic
mechanisms aiming at more efficient pollution control. Colombia has been adopting
different economic instruments for pollution control such as credit subsides, tax/tariff
relief, deposit-refund schemes, forestry taxation, waste fees, liability instruments, and
pollution charges (Huber et al., 1999). Currently, tradable permits are being intro-
duced.
The Colombian water pollution charge has been selected as case of study because
it has been pointed out as a successful instrument for reducing water pollution levels.
The Colombian water pollution charge program has received positive reviews by or-
ganizations such as the World-Bank (2000), the Colombian government (Colombian
Ministry of the Environment, 2002), the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America and Caribbean(ECLAC/CEPAL) and The Andean Center for Eco-
nomics in the Environment (CAEMA/ACEE) (2001). Those studies point out the
program as a successful example where an economic instrument is effective reducing
pollution. Also, it is worthy to mention that among economic incentives policies de-
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scribed in section 1.1.2, pollution charges and marketable permits have received the
most recent attention in developing countries (Blackman, 2005).
Control of water pollution in Colombia, as in several countries, rises as a need
to reduce not only the negative effects that it has in the environment but also the
perversive effects that it has over the population wellbeing. In this chapter, water
pollution problems in Colombia and their effects on the environment and the popu-
lation, are presented. In Section 2.2, a brief description of the legal foundation for
water pollution control, in particular for the pollution charge program, is presented.
In sections 2.3 and 2.4 the implementation and results of the program are reviewed.
2.1 Antecedents
Colombia has problems with ground water pollution and surface water pollution.
Despite the lack of information on groundwater quality, some aquifers are clearly
polluted. Sources of this pollution include agricultural run off, septic tanks, land fills
and the infiltration of coastal aquifers by seawater (Blackman, 2005).
Evidence suggest that in Colombia most of the water pollution (80%) comes from
non-point sources or diffuse sources. It originates from many places, or from a
widespread area and it is caused by rainfall moving over and through the ground
(e. g oil, grease, and toxic chemicals from urban runoff). A smaller percentage, 20%,
of Colombia’s water pollution comes from point sources, which comes from specific
points (e. g. discharges from wastewater treatment plants and operational wastes
from industries). Non-point sources are much more difficult to control, as Blackman
(2005:6) notes,
“In Colombia -as in most countries with significant agricultural sectors-
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non point sources are responsible for the majority of certain types of water
pollution. Unfortunately, non-point sources are particularly difficult to
control. As a result, policy makers tend to focus on point sources”.
The municipal or domestic sector - effluents from households collected by public
sewer systems from the towns and urban settlements- according to several analysis,
is the leading contributor to point sources water pollution. In Colombia, a significant
percent of the waste water is not collected into municipal sewer systems (Blackman,
2005). For example, Colombia has 60% coverage of sewer system, with a 79% coverage
at the urban level. But only 12% of the 60% of waste water collected is treated (San-
tamar´ıa and Villa, 2004:75). Also, the municipalities lack of wastewater treatment
plants and if they have treatment plants, they operate poorly; as of 1999 16% of the
1089 Colombian municipalities had operating treatment plants (Blackman, 2005).
On the other hand, industrial sources not only contribute organic matter but also
chemicals, toxics, and heavy metals to the water pollution. In Colombia most of
the industrial wastewater, as it happen with the domestic one, is not treated. As
Blackman (2005:7) repots,
“According to IDEAM (2002b), a report on the state of environmental
quality in Colombia’s urban areas, in 66% of 66 cities studied, no industries
treated wastewater. In 23% of the cities, less than 50% did. In 7. 5% of
the cities between 50 and 100% did, and in only 3. 1% of the cities did
100% of the industries treat their wastewater.”
As a result, many of Colombia’s most important rivers such as Bogota´, Cali,
Cauca, Medell´ın, de Oro, Lebrija, Pasto, Pamplonita, Combeima, and Otu´n, are
severely polluted (Blackman, 2005:6).
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This water pollution situation has effects related to people’s health, the increasing
in abatement costs of the water, devaluation of lands close to polluted water streams,
reduction in the tourist and recreational activities, reduction on fishing, and effects
on farming (Arjona et al., 2000). For instance, the lack of access to safe water and
sanitation cause water and sanitation-related diseases, which diarrhoea and cholera
are among the most common. Many people use completely untreated or poor treated
water taken directly from rivers. As a result, thousands of children die every day
from diarrhoea. In Colombia diseases, related to contaminated water are the main
cause of death in children up to 14 years old. According to the Pan American Health
organization in 2000, Colombia had 4. 8 million children under 5 years old. The
infant mortality rate was 21 deaths per 1, 000 live births and ranged from 17 in
Bogota´ to 29 in the coastal area. In this age group, the prevalence of diarrhea was
13. 9%. Also in 1998, Colombia presented intestinal infectious diseases such as the
cholera reporting in 1998 a total of 445 cases and 7 deaths.
To improve the situation the Colombian government has launched different kinds
of pollution control policies: command and control and economic mechanisms. The
command and control policies consist in discharge standards, where all dischargers of
liquid wastes need a discharge permit from their regional environmental authorities.
As described by Blackman (2005:7) this policy does not specify pollution abatement
methods, equipment or strategies; also none of Colombia’s discharge standards are
industry-specific.
Colombia was under mechanisms of command and control for the control of the
pollution since 1977 and as the statement by the Vice Minister of Environment Fabio
Arjona Hincapie (World-Bank, 2002) express: The experience that we had with com-
mand and control mechanisms in 23 years, we have had little pollution control results
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and really high costs of pollution reduction. In general, command and control policy
have preformed quite poorly. Some of the reasons for this outcome are described by
Blackman (2005:8) and they include:
• Inadequate inventories of dischargers. Situation that leads to un-existence or
outdated information necessary to control pollution.
• Low or incomplete permit level. Only 31% of permits requested by the facilities
have been issued.
• Inefficiency by the regional environmental agencies to confer permits to the
solicitant facilities and low monitoring. It leads to less than half of polluting
facilities were inspected.
In addition to the command and control policies, Colombia adopted the discharge
fee program as part of economic mechanisms to control water pollution. The initial
charges are limited to two water pollutants:
• Biological oxygen demand (BOD) a measure of the oxygen used by microorgan-
isms to decompose organic waste.
• Total suspended solids (TSS) a measure of the mass of fine inorganic particles
suspended in the water.
2.2 Legal Foundation
Colombia has a decentralized environmental management system, with the Ministry of
Environment as the main regulatory authority and the Regional Autonomous Corpo-
rations as environmental agencies at the regional level. The Ministry of Environment
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was established by Colombia’s Congress in 1993. Among its functions are the formu-
lation, managing, orientation and coordination of environmental policies, programs
and tools driven to the preservation and restoration of the environment (Colombian
Ministry of the Environment, 2006).
The Law 99 in 1993 confers the regional environmental agencies with the maxi-
mum authority at the regional level. There are 33 regional environmental agencies,
distributed in 26 Regional Autonomous Corporations (CAR) and seven Sustainable
Development Corporations(CDS) with considerable fiscal and policy autonomy. Ad-
ditionally, there are six Urban Environmental Authorities (AAU) in Colombia’s most
populous cities. As Blackman (2005:7) states CARs, CDSs and AAUs, are the front
line of pollution control in Colombia, being responsible for implementing and enforc-
ing programs and policies designed by the Ministery of the Environment.
The legal foundation for water protection in Colombia starts with Law 2811 of 1974
-The Renewable Resources and Environmental Protection National Code- in which
pollution charges are introduced as fees for direct or indirect use of the environment
-water, air, fisheries, and forests- for profitable activities. Immediate implementation
of the program did not happen because it calls for legislation to define profitable
activities(Santamar´ıa and Villa, 2004:78). The very few applications of these charges
were implemented with a cost-recovery approach attempting to cover the operating
costs of monitoring systems. (Huber et al., 1999:31)
In 1984, the use of water was regulated with Law 1594. Pollution charges were
further defined, such as how to calculate and how and how often to pay. But the
implementation of the program was not successful because of the complex process
and amount of information necessary to calculate the fee. (Santamar´ıa and Villa,
2004:78)
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Figure 2.1: Colombia’s Regional Environmental Agencies
Source: Colombian association of regional environmental agencies (ASOCAR)
In 1993, new environmental legislation (Law 99/93) was passed in Colombia. In
this legislation, pollution charges are defined according to the value of environmental
services and the cost of environmental damages. As Huber et al. (1999:32) points out,
the new criteria attempt to bring charge levels to optimum levels, in the Pigouvian
sense, measured by economic welfare losses. Also, it eliminates the cost-recovery
limitations of charges, which now may be set on a tax level basis.
Finally, Law 901 of 1997, established a nationwide pollution charge program for
water pollution. The fee is set for all types of activities, not only for profitable ones
(Santamar´ıa and Villa, 2004:80). The program, according to Arjona et al. (2000:10)
was designed and implemented to face three constrains: 1) the lack of information
about the cost for pollution and the abatement cost in each watershed; 2) the institu-
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tional instability of the environmental agencies; and 3) the inflexibility in regulations
present because of the decades of command and control approaches 1.
Law 901 of 1997 includes the following key provisions listed by Blackman (2005)and
Sterner (2003):
• Discharge inventory and baseline. Consisting in the development of invento-
ries of all facilities discharging BOD and TSS, by CARs and AAUs, and the
establishment of a baseline discharge levels for each pollutant.
• Pollution reduction targets. CARs and AAUs are to delineate water basins
in their jurisdictions and set five-year pollution reduction goals for aggregate
discharges into each basin. It is worthy to mention that these goals are to be
set by the boards of directors of each CAR or AAU, and well as representatives
of national and local governments, key productive sectors, and environmental
nongovernmental organizations. The pollution reduction goals are to take into
account the environmental and social damages generated by pollutants as well
as differences across regions in pollution assimilation capacity, socioeconomic
conditions, and the opportunity costs of resources.
• Fee setting. Colombian ministry of the environment is to establish a minimum
discharge rate for all facilities in the entire country. This fee can be adjusted
upwards in each water basin based on a specified formula (see Appendix 1 for
details). In essence, the formula adjusts the fee upwards by a multiplicative
factor of 0. 5 for each semester (six-month period) that the pollution reduction
target is not met.
1These three constrains are further analyzed in section 1.2
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• Monitoring and invoicing. CARs and AAUs are to monitor facilities’ discharges
every six months relying on facility self-reports (based on approved sampling
methods) verified by random checks. Invoices and payments are to be made
monthly.
• Relationship between discharge permits and fees. Paying discharge fees does not
exonerate facilities from the responsibility of complying with permits or CAC
emissions standards. In theory then-that is, assuming that dischargers are com-
plying with emissions standards-discharge fees only apply to those discharges
remaining after the standards have been met.
• Reporting. Each semester, CAR and AAU directors have to present to both their
board of directors and to MMA a report detailing pollution loads, invoicing and
collections.
Additional characteristics of Colombia’s water pollution charge program, not ex-
pressed in law 901of 1997, are:
• The pollution charge program supports “regional decontamination funds” used
for local environmental projects, after some portion was diverted to fund agency
budgets.
• The pollution goal is to be modified every five years -by boards of direc-
tors of each regional environmental agency, representatives of national and
local governments, key productive sectors, and environmental nongovernmen-
tal organizations- because the economic, social and environmental conditions
change over time at all levels (evolution of clean technologies, environmental
preferences of the communities) Arjona et al. (2000).
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2.3 Implementation
The main goal of Colombian water pollution charge is to cause reduction of pollution
discharge levels and, as a secondary goal, to generate financial resources designate to
fund activities and projects that have environmental purposes (Colombian Ministry
of the Environment, 2002).
With this vision the water pollution program was implemented in 1997 by seven
regional pollution control authorities. The rest of the regional environmental agen-
cies were implementing the program through the following years. The first regional
pollution control authority to implement water pollution charge was CORNARE,
which started billing local factories for emissions in 1998. By 2001, 24 out of the
33 regional environmental agencies in Colombia had implemented the program with
different results. As it is noted in Arjona et al. (2000:31), after three years of program
implementation, the program was not adopted by the total regional environmental
agencies; despite the constant training, implementation and evaluation before the
final stage of the program, which is the real pollution reduction. Even though, in
general the program, during its first five years seem to be successful, reflected in the
achievement of the pollution reduction goals (World-Bank, 2000).
Providing technical assistance was one of the initiatives of the Ministry aimed to
help the discharge fee system implementation across regional environmental authori-
ties national wide (Blackman, 2005). The technical assistance included the develop-
ment of a implementation manual identifying the tasks the regional environmental
agencies needed to accomplish the discharge system implementation. Also, the or-
ganization of expert groups provided guidance on implementation. The ministry of
the environment arranged a series of seminars to disseminate technical information
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and the best practices about the program among the agencies. In the same trend,
key private-sector program participants, such as National Federation of Coffee, were
targeted through series of workshops to building program credibility.
The water pollution charge implementation was promoted in the most capable
regional environmental authorities first as a way to generate early successes. In this
way, the Colombia Ministry of the Environment was able to create a top-down tech-
nical assistance program, among CARs and AAUs, using the CARs with the most
successful programs (e. g CVC, CORNARE and CARDER).
2.4 Results
Evaluations and analysis of the program for water pollution control in Colombia have
been conducted by several organizations and authors such as the World Bank (1999)
and (2000);the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Economic Commission for Latin America ECLAC/CEPAL (2000); Colombia’s Min-
istry of the Environment (2002); CAEMA(2001); Acquatella (2001); and Blackman
(2005). These studies are based on preliminary data from the first five years of the
program(1997 until 2002).
In such analysis, the positions about the results of pollution fees implementation
are presented mainly as successful or mostly successful in reducing water pollution.
In this context some works also explain, as a success factor, how the program has
strengthened the institutional capacity of the pollution control agencies in the regions.
Nevertheless, the studies also address some problems of the program.
Regarding the success of the water pollution charge program reducing BOD and
TSS levels, several studies conducted find that the program was responsible for sig-
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nificant reductions. According to the water charge program evaluation conducted by
Colombian Ministry of the Environment (2002), the nine CARs that implemented
properly the charge programm presented a reduction of 27% in BOD and 45% in TSS
levels. The industrial sector presents the highest reduction levels with 50.6% in BOD
and 58.4% in TSS.
The Andean Center for Economics in the Environment (CAEMA/ACEE) (2001)
evaluated the impact of the fee program on discharges in three regional environmental
authorities: CVC, Cornare, and DADIMA during the period 1997 to 2000. This case
study shows that with the discharge fee program, the reduction in the pollution levels
was higher than those obtained with command and control policies.
Likewise, Sterner (2003) claims that Colombia provides a interesting example of
environmental fee that is working despite what at least some outsiders might think
of as a difficult policy environment. Sterner (2003) analyzes one of Colombia’s re-
gional environmental agencies, CORNARE, showing that this agency reduced by 28%
BOD pollution from one of the basins within six months of implementing the charge.
One aspect the author emphasizes is that the collected charges from industry, in
CORNARE, works as a way to fund environmental projects and at the same time,
strengthens the regional environmental agency.
“Collected charges from industry have provided funds not only for
environmental investments in the industries but also for staffing the envi-
ronmental agencies. This element of long -run capacity building is hoped
to strengthen the institutions so that they will be better equipped to
manage other sectors later” (Sterner, 2003:324).
Sterner (2003) concludes that some of the features key to the success of the charge
2.4. Results 39
program in CORNARE - which reduced BOD discharges by 62% and TSS discharges
by 90% from 1997 to 2000 - at least during the first five years refers to:
• A high level of knowledge and commitment on the part of local staff that was
highly capacitated to implement the program. As Blackman (2005:19) notes,
CORNARE is recognized as one of Colombia’s stronger CARs that, as CVC,
strictly enforced discharge standards before it began setting up its discharge fee
program for the Negro River in late 1997 and before it began invoicing in 2000.
• Solid support by Colombian Environmental Ministry.
• Good technical information and data on pollution. It was corroborate by the
present study, which included CORNARE in the analysis because it was one of
the environmental agencies that presented a more complete information about
polluters and pollution discharges, program costs, quality of basins, among other
data.
• A relatively small region, which may facilitate monitoring.
• Good working relationship with the polluting industry. As it is mentioned
in the evaluation by The Andean Center for Economics in the Environment
(CAEMA/ACEE) (2001), reductions in BOD and TSS discharges in some envi-
ronmental agencies such as CORNARE may have been partly due to a series of
clean production agreements signed with water dischargers immediately before
the discharge fee program began. It shows strength in CORNARE’s institu-
tional capacity and also how this CAR was working closely with the industries
even before the implementation of the discharge fee.
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Besides the significant reduction of BOD and TSS reported by Regional envi-
ronmental agencies such as CORNARE, CDMB, CORPOURABA and CVC (Arjona
et al., 2000), the success of the water pollution charge in general across Colombia
according to scholars and policy makers highlight the following trends,
• The water pollution fee program has produced a change in attitude and men-
tality about pollution by regulators and regulated actors. For instance, in the
evaluation commissioned by CEPAL (2000), (Arjona et al., 2000) points out that
one of the results of the program is that regulated organizations have become
more conscious regarding their pollution problems as a result several companies
are studding for the first time cost-effective options to reduce pollution. Fur-
thermore, before, the program pollution issues were under the company’s low
range technicians. Now, the pollution problem is discussed by company man-
agers. It gives more relevance to the pollution problem and the ways to reduce
it.
• The water pollution charge programm allowed the creation of 27 community
projects for water pollution control (Colombian Ministry of the Environment,
2002). The process of these community includes the participation by public
and private polluters, NGOs and universities in setting reduction goals of water
pollution.
• The discharge fee program permitted the improvement and development of in-
formation about water resources. Water resources’ data bases have been created
and updated as a requirement by the polluters with the regional environmental
agencies and by those with the Ministry of the environment.
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• The pollution charge program became an important source of financial re-
sources. Higher financial resources increase environmental investment, strengthen
environmental initiatives and minimizing the impact of financial resource crisis
and reducing dependence on national budget.
• The The Andean Center for Economics in the Environment (CAEMA/ACEE)
(2001) report acknowledges that pollution charges contributed to the implemen-
tation of clean production solutions, by the companies, to decrease pollution
levels. For example, in CVC, one of the regional environmental agencies, reduc-
tions in discharges from sugar processing plants and the paper industry were
due to implementation of pollution prevention measures and clean technolo-
gies (versus end-of-pipe treatment). It is worthy to mention that because the
implementation of pollution prevention measures and clean technologies, sugar
companies were able to reduce pollution even during periods where they have
an increase in the production ( e. g the sugar industry growth during 1998-1999
was 5. 6%.
• The discharge fees created incentives for polluters to cut emissions in a cost
effective manner as well as for regulatory authorities to improve permitting,
monitoring, and enforcementBlackman (2005).
On the other hand, some of the problems with the water pollution fee program,
described by scholars and policymakers, include:
• Slow and limited implementation in some regional environmental authorities.
As it is noted in Arjona et al. (2000:31), after three years of program imple-
mentation the program was not adopted by the total regional environmental
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agencies, in 2000 54% of the regional environmental agencies had a pollution
reduction goal and a 16% was in process to implement the program. This perfor-
mance was presented despite the constant process of training, implementation
and evaluation provided by the Ministry of the Environment and also by the
strongest regional environmental agencies. Also, by 2000, 30% of the environ-
mental agencies have invoiced the polluters (The Andean Center for Economics
in the Environment (CAEMA/ACEE), 2001). In 2002, 24 CARs (72. 7%) in-
voiced and 21(63. 6%) collected. This situation show collection lagging behind
invoicing Blackman (2005:13).
• Some water companies initially presented resistance to the fee mechanism be-
cause the fee was seen by these companies as an additional cost where the utility
company is the one that has to pay the fee. This situation has been improv-
ing through technical accords among different institutions such as the Ministry
of the Environment, Potable Water and Sanity Regulatory Commission and
National Department of Planning (Arjona et al., 2000).
• Noncompliance by the majority of Municipalities and utilities companies (Colom-
bian Ministry of the Environment, 2002) . In 65% of the regional environmental
agencies, the domestic sector delay or do not pay the pollution fee arguing in
several occasions that they do not have resources to pay. In the remaining
agencies, 35% the environmental authorities have been the creation of funds by
the CARs to co-finance waste water treatment plants. During 1997-2002, the
municipalities were invoiced for over one third of all discharge fees and from this
amount they only paid 40% (Blackman, 2005:15). This situation created ten-
sion among the industry and agriculture sector that complies with the policy.
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The industrial sector have argued that they are being punished for the fail-
ure of municipal sewage authorities to control their discharges, given that the
fee increases every semester because the reduction target is missed (Blackman,
2005:16).
• Low collection rates. Only 33.8% of the fees invoiced were collected by the
regional environmental agencies during 1997-2002 (Colombian Ministry of the
Environment, 2002). Blackman (2005:15), reports even a lower collection rate
of 27%, ranging from a low of 1% for CARSUCRE, CORPOAMAZONIA and
CORPOCESAR to a high of 95% for CDMB and 54% for CORNARE.
• As it is mentioned by The Andean Center for Economics in the Environment
(CAEMA/ACEE) (2001:10), some of the regional environmental agencies where
the polluters are strong/powerful, the reduction goal is negotiated taking into
account the effort at the individual not the general effort possible for the basin.
Blackman (2005:14) argue that this situation is reflected in the significant dif-
ferences in pollution reduction goals. For example, the author notes that COR-
MACARENA’s BOD goal is 80% while CARDIQUE is 3% as for 2001 period.
The review of the Colombian case exposes that the water pollution program per-
formed differently across regional environmental in Colombia. This finding leads to
the second research question:
Which factors determine the performance of water
pollution charge program across regional environ-
mental agencies in Colombia?
Chapter 3
Research Analysis and Results
3.1 Research Design
3.1.1 Methodology
This study aims to answer the following questions:
• Does the performance of the pollution charge program in Colombia undermine
the notion that economic instruments are not feasible in developing countries?
• Which factors determine the performance of the water pollution charge program
across regional environmental agencies in Colombia?
These questions are answered through the analysis of data from the first five years
of implementation of the program (from 1997 until 2002). 1
The unit of analysis are the regional environmental agencies and the corporate
units they supervise. The data sample is composed by 255 corporations/polluters in
three representative environmental agencies:
• Corporacio´n Auto´noma Regional de las Cuencas de los Rı´os Negro y Nare,
CORNARE.
1The second phase of the program, that starts with the reform introduced by Decree 3100 of
2003 and Decree 3440 of 2004 is not analyzed because the program established by those regulations
is too new, and therefore there is not enough data collected, to evaluate it.
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• Corporacio´n para el Desarrollo Sostenible del Archipie´lago de San Andre´s, Prov-
idencia y Santa Catalina, CORALINA.
• Corporacio´n Auto´noma Regional para el Desarrollo Sostenible del Choco´, CODE-
CHOCO.
In 2002, Colombia’s Ministry of the Environment presented an evaluation of the
water pollution charge program. In that evaluation, the Ministry of the environment
divided the regional agencies into three categories (A, B and C) according to how
effective they were in implementing and executing the charge program. Group A
being the ones presenting the best performance and C being the worst. Performance
was measured in terms of:
• Length of time conducting the program.
• Effort made to implement all the key aspects of the program.
• Quality of monitoring, as well as quality of data, of discharge levels of pollutants
and their corresponding polluters.
• Invoice enforcement and money collection.
Nine out of 32 of the regional environmental agencies were in group A; 13 were in
group B and 10 were in group C.
For this study, one regional environmental agency was selected from category A
(CORNARE), and two from category B (CORALINA AND CODECHOCO). The
selection was made upon data availability, difference in financial capacity and differ-
ences in diversity and culture of the regions where they operate. No environmental
agency was selected from category C because the environmental agencies from this
category have poor or no data.
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Figure 3.1: Regional environmental agencies administrative performance
The data used in this study is mainly secondary data. It was collected primarily
from the periodical reports that the regional environmental agencies have to present
to Colombian Environmental Ministry - these agencies had to report every six months
before the 2003 reform and annually after it- and from the data bases of the environ-
mental agencies. The periodical reports include information about polluters within
each regional environmental agency domain, such as polluter’s economic activity,
discharges of BOD and TSS, among others. The reports also include data at the
environmental agency and basin level such as program’s monitoring costs and pollu-
tion reduction goal respectively. The data base quality was improved by identifying
duplicated (inconsistent) cases, i.e. same polluter for one period, and checking if it
was possible to distinguish the entries and name them differently. Also, the data base
was aggregated through time improving it completeness.
The data was obtained from the office of Economic Analysis of Colombian En-
vironmental Ministry, referred by two people who worked in the discharge fee pro-
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gram: Thomas Black and Luis Fernando Castro. Thomas Black was Chief of the
Office of Economic Analysis Ministry of Environment during 1996 to 2000, designing
and implementing economic instruments for pollution control, including the water
discharge fee program. Luis Fernando Castro was director of Pollution Control at
CORNARE. Both people also participated in 2002 discharge fee program evaluation,
for which the data that each agency reported was used.
The described data was complemented by other studies about this topic. Espe-
cially, the national evaluation of the pollution charges conducted by the Colombia’s
environmental agency in 2002 Colombian Ministry of the Environment (2002). Addi-
tional documentation includes studies from the Andean Center for Economics in the
Environment (CAEMA), World Bank- The Economics of Industrial Pollution Con-
trol Research Program, The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Colombia Na-
tional Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) and The Latin-American and
Caribbean Economic Commission- Sustainable Development commission (CEPAL).
3.1.2 Definition of Variables
Dependent variables:
The list of dependent variables considered in the study are related to water pollution,
measured by levels of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total solids suspended
(TSS).
BOD and TSS definition
Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) refers to the amount of oxygen that would
be consumed if all the organisms in one liter of water were oxidized by bacteria
and protozoa (ReVelle and ReVelle, 1988). Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) is a
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measure of the oxygen used by microorganisms to decompose organic waste. When
BOD levels are high, dissolved oxygen (DO) levels decrease because the oxygen that is
available in the water is being consumed by the bacteria. Since less dissolved oxygen
is available in the water, fish and other aquatic organisms may not survive. The BOD
is measured either in milligrams per liter (mg/L) or percent saturation. Milligrams
per liter is the amount of oxygen in a liter of water. Percent saturation is the amount
of oxygen in a liter of water relative to the total amount of oxygen that the water can
hold at that temperature.
Total Suspended solids (TSS) TSS is a measure of the mass of fine inorganic
particles suspended in the water. TSS concentration has two important ecological
impacts. First, TSS attenuates light, decreasing the light reaching the sediment.
Second, phosphorus is absorbed onto sediment surfaces. High TSS concentration
removes dissolved inorganic phosphorus from the water column, potentially reducing
algal growth. The mass of fine inorganic particles suspended in the water, TSS, is
typically expressed in milligrams per liter or mg/l.
The dependent variables are divided in two groups:
1. Water pollution control performance indicator(Reduction BOD Group).
Measurement Level : Nominal.
Values : Increase, decrease, no change
The indicator shows the performance of each polluter related to BOD and TSS
pollution: polluters that presented an increase in the levels of water pollution,
polluters that increased the levels of water pollution and polluters that presented
no change in the water pollution levels
2. Level of achievement of the program (Percent Reduction BOD).
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Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Percentage number
This variable is measured as the percentage of reduction on water pollution
levels, for BOD and TSS, achieved by the polluters in the five years considered.
The last quantity of BOD/TSS reported was taken and it was divided by the
quantity of BOD/TSS reported in 1998. 1998 was taken as the base year because
in many cases the information available for 1997 was unclear or inconsistent.
Independent variables:
The independent variables were selected to measure economic aspects of the country,
the characteristics of the regional environmental agencies and features of the polluters.
1. Regional Environmental Agency (CORNARE, CHOCO, CORALINA).
Measurement Level : Nominal
Values : Environmental Agency
2. Reduction goal of BOD and Reduction goal of TSS by basin (Reduct-
tionGoal BOD/TSS).
Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Average number
CARs and AAUs are to delineate water basins in their jurisdictions and set
five-year pollution reduction goals for aggregate BOD and TSS discharges into
each basin. As for the BOD reduction goals, TSS goals are set by the boards
of directors of each CAR or AAU, and well as representatives of national and
local governments, key productive sectors, and environmental nongovernmental
organizations. The TSS reduction goals is set by each basin every five years. The
reduction goal for BOD as well as for BOD is measure in percentage of reduction.
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This variable is expected to reflect if the goal that controllers, polluters and
community concerted is related to pollution reduction.
3. Minimum rate of BOD and Minimum rate of TSS (Min Rate BOD/TSS).
Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Average number in Colombian Pesos
The Minimum Rate of BOD and TSS is set every year by Colombian Ministry
of the Environment for all facilities in the entire country. For this analysis
the average through the ten periods was taken. This variable, as the economic
theory states is relevant to pollution reduction, because if it is too low the
polluter will prefer to pay the fee over reduce pollution.
4. Regional Factor per semester (Reg Factor).
Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Number
The regional factor is a multiplicative factor that increase 0.5 for each semester
that the pollution reduction target is not met. It is used to calculate the fee each
semester (see Appendix). It reflect how the group of polluters of a particular
basin is performing. For this analysis the factor reported by the basin in the
last (10th) semester was taken.
5. Fee Invoiced for BOD/TSS by polluter. (Invoice BOD/TSS)
Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Number in billions of Colombian Pesos
Every semester the CAR invoices a fee to the polluter according to the discharges
he made, the minimum rate and the regional factor. See Appendix A
6. Total Fee Invoiced by polluter. (Total Invoice)
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Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Number in billions of Colombian Pesos
This variable is calculated adding Invoice BOD and Invoice TSS
7. Percent amount collected by polluter (Perc Collected).
Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Percentage
The amount collected is the quantity each polluter pays to the CAR in response
to the fee invoiced by it. The percentage amount collected is calculated by divid-
ing total amount collected during 1997-2001 by total invoice. The information
for the collected was not available for each pollutant(BOD and TSS) it was
aggregated. This variable not only reflects the capacity of the regional environ-
mental agency to collect the fee but also how strong the agency is to do it. As
it was discussed, collection is an element of long-run capacity building so that
they will be better equipped to manage other pollution issues. This variable also
tell us about the relationship between the agency and the polluters and about
funding in the agency for investments. For instance, if the percentage of this
variable is low it mean that the agency is not strong to collect, that the agency
does not has effective mechanisms of collection, or that the agencies does not
recognize the control agency authority. The data was filtered by this variable
because in the process of data cleaning, outliers were observed. Those outliers
did not make sense because they say that there were polluters that pay more
that 150% even 500% to the agency, and we know that it would be unlikely to
happen when companies are trying of maximize profits and minimize costs.
8. Program cost per year by environmental agency (Prog Cost).
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Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Average number in billion of Colombian pesos
The water pollution charge program represent some administrative and opera-
tive costs to the agency (e.g cost of monitoring and take water samples, wage
of technicians, economist, etc). This variable can reflect how well the envi-
ronmental agency disposed of personnel to implement, operated and evaluated
the program. You should expect that if the agency does not have adequate
personnel and instruments, the program will not succeed.
9. Region’s per-capita GDP (GDP).
Measurement Level : Interval-Ratio
Values : Average number in million of Colombian pesos
A region’s gross domestic product (GDP) is one of several measures of the size of
its economy. The GDP divided by the population or per-capita GDP gives you
an idea of how wealthy the people are on average. This variable was introduced
in the analysis to check if the economic situation of the region cause ant change
in the reduction of water pollution.
10. Basin.
(BasinG1, BasinG2, BasinG3, BasinG4)
Measurement Level : Nominal
Values : see Table 3.1
There are a total of 14 basins for all three agencies selected for this study. For
the regression purposes, they were recorded into a four groups using compare
mean analysis(One way ANOVA), basins with no significant difference in their
means were put together. Additionally, the decision tree technique was applied
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Table 3.1: Basins by Environmental Agency and group
Basin Environmental Agency BOD Group TSS Group
RioBueyPie Cornare 1 1
RioClaroCo Cornare 1 2
RioMagdalena Cornare 2 3
RioNare Cornare 2 3
RioNegro Cornare 3 4
RioNus Cornare 2 3
SamanaNorte Cornare 2 2
SamanaSur Cornare 2 1
Atrato Choco 4 2
Darien Choco 4 3
Pacifica-Baudo Choco 4 1
Acuifero Coralina 2 2
Mar Coralina 1 3
to create basin groups. To enter the four basin categories into the regression
model, the four categories were recoded into dummy variables.
11. Economic activity of polluter by agency
(Agroindustry, Industry, Domestic).
Measurement Level : Nominal
Values : Agriculture-industry, Industry and Domestic
Each polluter was classified into an economic activity category named Agro-
industry, Industry or Domestic. This variable reflects the economic activity
that each company has and also characterize the environmental agency region
as more agricultural, industrial or domestic In other words this variable also
give us information at the regional level. To enter the three economic activ-
ity categories into the regression model, the four categories were recoded into
dummy variables.
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12. Economic sub-activity of polluter by agency.
(EconSubActG1, EconSubActG2, EconSubActG3, EconSubActG4)
Measurement Level : Nominal
Values : see table 3.2
There are a total of 10 economic sub-activities for all three agencies. For the
regression purposes, they were recorded into a four groups using compare mean
analysis(One way ANOVA), and sub-activities with no significant difference in
their means were put together. Also, the decision tree techniques was applied
to determine the best combination of sub-activities for each group. To enter
the four sub-activities categories into the regression model, the four categories
were recoded into dummy variables.
Table 3.2: Economic Sub-activities
Economic Sub-activity BOD Group TSS Group
Fishery 2 1
Poultry 2 2
Flower Industry 3 3
Utilities Companies 1 3
Hotels and Tourism 2 4
Industry and Agricultural Industry 4 2
Institutions 3 1
Municipalities 2 4
Slaughter Houses 1 1
Textile 3 1
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3.1.3 Method of Analysis
3.1.4 Decision Tree
First decision trees are constructed to predict the dependent variables Reduction
BOD Group and Reduction TSS Group, in terms of the independent variables ( e.g.
see the tree TBOD shown in Figure 3.2.1).
A decision tree is a flow chart or diagram representing a classification system or
predictive model. The tree is structured as a sequence of simple questions, and the
answers to these questions trace a path down the tree. The end point reached deter-
mines the classification or prediction made by the model, which can be a qualitative
judgment or a numerical forecast. A decision tree can be learned by splitting the
source set into subsets based on an attribute value test(Breiman, Friedman, Olshen,
and Stone, 1984).
This process is repeated on each derived subset in a recursive manner. The recur-
sion is completed when splitting is either non-feasible, or a singular classification can
be applied to each element of the derived subset.
To construct a two decision trees, CART, a well-know and widely used commercial
software package, is used. It has different options that determine the way the decision
tree is generated as well as the final tree obtained. In CART there is a pay off and
a cost associated to each tree generated. The pay off is related to how many cases
are classified correctly, the cost is related to how big is the tree, how small (number
of cases) are the terminal nodes and how well the nodes split the data. The options
in CART are basically to choose the parameters of a cost function and the pay off
function. The options considered here are the four combinations obtained by giving
the same or different costs for the misplaced cases (It can make sense to have a bigger
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cost assigned to a decreasing case placed as increasing than as not change), and by
choosing the pay off function being information gain or Gini impurity. In this work
only the generated decision tree for the case of equal costs for different misplacement
and Gini impurity method is presented, because the four different trees obtained only
present small differences.
The quality of a decision tree is measure in terms of the prediction error. To
measure the prediction error the tree is tested in new data (different from the one
used to construct the tree). When constructing the tree, CART divides the data in
two sets, a sample data set, used to construct the tree, and a test data set, used to
test the tree (e.g. see Table 3.3 and 3.5).
The most valuable information contained in the decision tree is the emphvariable
importance, a measure of how much a variable influences the decisions taken in the
tree. The variable importance hints to which independent variables best explain the
dependent one. The decision tree also hints to how the nominal variables could be
grouped. In this work, the information obtained from four different decision trees
where used in conjunction to the information from the one-way ANOVA to define the
different groups for the variables Economic Sub-Activity and Basin.
3.1.5 Bi-variate and Multivariate Analysis
This study also used SPSS software package to obtain bi-variate and multi-variate
analysis of the variables. The bi-variate techniques used were one-way analysis of
variance and and Pearson Correlation Coefficients to check relationship between the
independent variables and the dependent variable regarding the reduction of BOD
and TSS levels. The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates the strength and the
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direction of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The
multi-variate technique used was a linear regression to produce a more efficient and
precise explanation of how the independents variables are related to the dependent
one.
The intention of the decision tree analysis as well as the bivariate and multivariate
analysis is to enhance the understanding of what kind of aspects drive pollutants to
a change in the levels of pollution.
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3.1.6 Limitations
The development of this study presents data limitations for a number of reasons:
The selection of the regional environmental agencies to be taking into the analysis
was made not only according to how effective they were implementing and executing
the charge program, but also according to availability of information. This process
required the search for information in all regional environmental agencies, which have
implemented the program, and then discard those that lack on information. The three
environmental agencies, CORNARE, CODECHOCO and CORALINA were the ones
with the most complete data.
In the same trend, the study presents limitations availability and quality. For
instance, for bivariate analysis it is important to have the data for all the years that
are going to be analyzed. If there is not complete data for a year from a particular
source, that case is discarded. To solve this problem, aggregation was needed. Data
for each variable was aggregated through time and depend. This procedure also
solved the problem with some of the variables that were aggregated already and it
was impossible to be disaggregated.
There was also a lack of reliable inventories and databases. There were some
inconsistencies in data report, which detracts from reliable data standards. Some
values present a sudden change in order of magnitude for a particular time entry.
It is not clear if this type of error could have been produced at the time of typing
the data or if it can be a problem in the procedures that the regional environmental
agencies use to report the data.
Also, as Blackman (2005:1) states, the results that can be derived from the data
base used “are not necessarily as impressive as they appear for two reasons. First, they
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are based on data that is self reported by dischargers...Second, the reductions in BOD
and TSS are not necessarily due solely to economic incentives generated by discharge
fees -they also reflect the impact of CAC and pollution prevention programs”. As
the author discusses in detail, the effectiveness of verification of the data -by CARs,
the Ministry of the Environment and the a government official- varies across CARSs.
Despite this problem, as the author also states, the size of the measured reduction in
BOD and TSS are so large that the results should show significant impact in pollution
reduction.
Finally, some of the variables that according to the literature review were impor-
tant to determine the success of the program were not included in the present model
analysis because lack of data to do so. Such is the case of information about munic-
ipal waste water treatment plants. Scholars and policy makers point out this factor
as a key difficulty for water pollution reduction.
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3.2 Results BOD Model
3.2.1 Decision tree analysis
The tree TBOD illustrates how decision trees make predictions. For instance’ given a
(new) polluter’ with Economic Subactivity 11 (Slaughter House)’ TBOD predicts that
its pollution level would increase. As another instance’ given a polluter with Economic
Subactivity 6 (Hotels and Tourism)’ TBOD will look at the average program cost for
the corresponding environmental agency; if it is bigger than 0.5696’ TBOD would
predict that the polluter’s pollution level would not change. On the other hand if the
program cost is smaller than 0.5696’ TBOD will look at the min rate for BOD set by
the environmental agency. If it is bigger than 55.17’ TBOD would predict not change
in the pollution levels’ while in the other case it would predict a decrease of them.
Figure 3.2: Decision Tree for Reduction BOD Group
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The prediction errors on the sample data and test data for TBOD are shown in
Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Prediction Errors on sample data and test date for the tree TBOD
Misclassification for Learn Data Misclassification for Test Data
Class N N Mis- Percent Class N N Mis- Percent
Cases Classed Error Cases Classed Error
Increase 49 8 16.33 Increase 49 12 24.49
No Change 107 20 18.69 No Change 107 29 27.10
Decrease 95 13 13.68 Decrease 95 16 16.84
The scores for variable importance for TBOD are given in Table 3.4. The first five
variables that best explain the dependent one’ Reduction BOD Group’ are: program
cost’ GDP’ economic sub-activity’ minimum rate BOD and amount collected.
Table 3.4: Scores for variable importance TBOD
Variable Importance
Variable Score
Prog Cost 100.00
GDP 92.94
Econ SubAct 82.44
Min Rate BOD 71.95
Amount Collected 65.09
Perc Collected 52.73
BASIN 44.26
Num Periods 37.80
Env Agency 37.59
Invoice BOD 15.71
Econ Activity 3.08
Reg Factor 3.02
The decision tree also hints to how the nominal variables could be grouped. For
example’ TBOD hints to separate the variable Econ SubAct in the groups {5′11}’
{1′3′6′9} and {4′7′8′12}.
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3.2.2 Bi-variate Analysis
One-way ANOVA
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to explore the relationship between
the dependent variable: percent reduction BOD (interval/ratio) and the independent
variables: economic subactivity and basin (nominal). Testing the hypothesis that the
average percent reduction BOD is equal within economic sub-activities groups and
within basins, see Table B, we found that for: a) the first case F=4.666 and the
level of significance = 0.000 (<0.05) and b) the second case F=4.824 and the level of
significance was 0.000 (<0.05). In both cases there is enough evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that the means are equal among economic sub-activities and basins
respectively.
Looking for the groups with similar means we were able to construct new basin
categories with similar reduction BOD average. This process was complemented by
the decision trees procedures.
Pearson correlation coefficients
Pearson correlation coefficients technic was used to examine relationship between the
independent variables and the dependent ones regarding the reduction of BOD levels.
Based on the significance level smaller than 0.05, showed in Table B, there is
enough information to reject the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship
between percentage reduction in BOD and Min Rate BOD, Prog Cost, GDP, Perc
Collected, CORNARE, CHOCO, EconSubActG1, BasinG1, BasinG2, BasinG3 and
BasinG4. Additionally, the positive sing of the correlation coefficient observed tell us
that the direction of that linear relationship is:
3.2. Results BOD Model 63
• Positive for Min Rate BOD, Prog Cost, GDP, Perc Collected, CORNARE,
BasinG1 and BasinG3.
• Negative for CHOCO, EconSubActG1, BasinG2, BasinG4
3.2.3 Multi-variate Analysis: linear regression
Linear regression is used to analyze the relationship between the independent variables
and two different dependent variables: Reduction BOD group and Percent Reduction
BOD.
Dummy variables were recorded for the different groups of Econ Activity, Env
Agency, Econ Sub-activity and Basin variables (see Section 3.1.2).
To generate both models, the enter procedure was used. This procedure included
all the independent variables in the regression. It was checked that tolerance level
for multi-collinearity or all the variables was larger than 0.1. Independent variables
that presented a tolerance lower than 0.1, were excluded. The variables excluded,
in both models were: Total Invoice, Amount Collected, Min Rate BOD, Prog Cost,
CORNARE and CHOCO.
The variable Reduction goal of BOD was excluded because it has the same value
for all the polluters in the three regional environmental agencies, so it was a constant
for the model.
The remaining variables were included in a two new regressions using ENTER
procedure and BACKWARD, obtaining that:
• Using ENTER procedure, the variables that best predict the changes in Percent
Reduction BOD are BasinG1 and BasinG3 with significance levels for the re-
spective t values smaller than 0.05, for all other variables the level of significance
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was larger than the set threshold(0.05). So, for BasinG1 and BasinG3 there is
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the partial coefficients of
these variables are 0. See Model 1 in Table B.
Following, using BACKWARD procedure the final model, see Model 11 in Table
B, is:
Percent Reduction BOD =− 0.142 + 0.380Perc Collected (3.1)
+ 0.416BasinG1 + 0.264BasinG3 (3.2)
This model includes BasinG1 and BasinG3 and in addition includes Perc Col-
lected. The corresponding t values and significance levels for each variable are:
for Perc Collected 3.93 and 0.000, for BasinG1 3.482 and 0.001, for BasinG3
4.127 and 0.000. In all cases the level of significance is smaller than 0.05, so for
each variable, there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient is zero.
From the slopes we can see that the relationship between Percent Reduction
BOD and Perc Collected, BasinG1, and BasinG3 is positive.
The R Square = 0.218 suggest that 21.8% of the variability in Percent Reduction
BOD, can be explained by the variables of the model.
• The same procedure used for Percent Reduction BOD was applied for Reduction
BOD group. Using ENTER procedure first, the variables that best predict
the changes in the dependent variable are Percent Collected, EconSubActG1,
BasinG1 and BasinG3, see Model 2 in Table B. Next, using BACKWARD
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procedure the final model, see Model 10 in Table B, includes the same variables
than model 2:
Reduction BOD group =− 0.099 + 0.629Perc Collected− 0.893EconSubActG1
(3.3)
+ 0.495Basin G1 + 0.247Basin G3 (3.4)
The corresponding t values and significance levels for each variable are as follow:
for Perc Collected 4.641 and 0.000, for EconSubActG1 -6.631 and 0.000, for
BasinG1 2.964 and 0.003, for BasinG3 2.386 and 0.018. In all cases the level of
significance is smaller than 0.05, so for each variable, there is enough evidence
to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero.
From the slopes we can see that the relationship between Percent Reduction
BOD and Perc Collected, BasinG1, and BasinG3 is positive and for EconSub-
ActG1 is negative.
The R Square = 0.476 suggest that 47.6% of the variability in Percent Reduction
BOD, can be explained by the variables of the model.
3.3 Results TSS Model
3.3.1 Decision tree analysis
The decision tree for Reduction TSS Group, TTSS, is shown in Figure 3.3. The TTSS
tree predicts that given a polluter, for instance, with a fee invoiced greater than 0.0003
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billions of colombian pesos, TTSS will look at the Min Rate of TSS; if it is smaller
than 20.539 , TTSS predicts that polluter’s TSS levels would increase.
Figure 3.3: Decision Tree for Reduction TSS Group
The quality of TTSS, measure in terms of the prediction error on the sample data
and test data are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.5: Prediction Errors on sample data and test date for the tree TTSS
In the TSS case the scores of variable importance, shown in Table 3.6, suggest
that the two variables that influence the most the decisions taken in the tree are:
minimum rate and fee invoiced.
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Table 3.6: Prediction Errors on sample data and test date for the tree TTSS
3.3.2 Bi-variate Analysis results
One-way ANOVA
The ANOVA was also used to explore the relationship between percent reduction TSS
(interval/ratio) and economic subactivity and basin (nominal variables). Testing the
hypothesis that the average percent reduction TSS is equal within economic sub-
activities groups and within basins we found that for the first case F=1.424 and the
level of significance=0.178 (>0.05) and for the second case F=1.321 and the level of
significance was 0.220 (>0.05). In both cases there is not enough evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that the means are equal among economic sub-activities and basins
respectively. Even though we were not able to use one-way ANOVA to chose groups
with similar means, the selection was made using the decision trees procedure.
Pearson correlation coefficients
Pearson correlation coefficients technic was used to examine the relationship between
the independent variables and the dependent ones, regarding the reduction of TSS
levels.
Table C shows that the Pearson Correlation coefficient for Min Rate and BasinG3
is 0.178 and 0.212 with a significant level of 0.003 and 0.001 respectively. Based on
the significance level, smaller than the set threshold 0.05, we can conclude that there
is enough information to reject the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship
between percentage reduction in TSS and Min Rate and BasinG3. These two inde-
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pendent variables are positive related to percentage reduction in TSS, indicated by
to the sing of the correlation coefficients.
On the other hand, the significant level of the rest of the variables is greater than
0.05, so there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is not
relationship between those variables and percentage reduction in TSS.
3.3.3 Multi-variate Analysis: linear regression
Linear regression is used to analyze the relationship between the independent variables
and two different dependent variables: Reduction TSS group and Percent Reduction
TSS.
Dummy variables were recorded for the different groups of Econ Activity, Env
Agency, Econ Sub-activity and Basin variables (For details see Section 3.1.2).
The enter procedure was used to generate reduction TSS group and percent re-
duction TSS models. This procedure included all the independent variables in the
regression. Followed, tolerance level was checked ensuring that multi-collinearity for
all the variables was larger than 0.1. Independent variables that presented a tolerance
lower than 0.1, were excluded. The variables excluded, in both models were: GDP,
CORNARE and CHOCO.
The variable Reduction goal of TSS was excluded because it was a constant for
the model, the value for all the polluters in the three regional environmental agencies
was the same.
The remaining variables were included in a two new regressions using ENTER
and BACKWARD procedure, obtaining that:
• Using ENTER procedure, the variables that best predict the changes in Percent
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Reduction TSS are: Min Rate TSS and Perc Collected with significance levels
for the respective t values smaller than 0.05, for all other variables the level
of significance was larger than the set threshold (0.05). So, there is enough
evidence to reject the null Hypothesis that the partial coefficients of Min Rate
and Perc Collected are 0. See Model 1 in Table C.
Following, using BACKWARD procedure the final model, see Model 1.2 in Table
C, is:
Percent Reduction TSS =− 0.356 + 0.021Min Rate TSS
+ 0.187Perc Collected + 0.299BasinG3
This model in addition to Min Rate and Perc Collected includes BasinG3. The
corresponding t values and significance levels for each variable are: for Min
Rate 2.455 and 0.015, for Perc Collected 1.914 and 0.057, and for BasinG3
3.101 and 0.002. In all cases the level of significance is smaller than 0.05, so for
each variable, there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient is zero.
From the slopes we can see that the relationship between Percent Reduction
BOD and Min Rate, Perc Collected, and BasinG3 is positive.
The R Square = 0.071 suggest that 7.1% of the variability in Percent Reduction
BOD, can be explained by the variables of the model.
• The same procedure used for Percent Reduction TSS was applied for Reduction
TSS group. Using ENTER procedure first, the variable that best predicts the
changes in the dependent variable is Min Rate TSS, see Model 2 in Table C.
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Next, using BACKWARD procedure, see Model 2.1 in Table C, the final model
is:
Reduction TSS group =− 1.014 + 0.053Min Rate
+ 0.510Basin G3
The corresponding t values and significance levels for each variable are as follow:
for Min Rate 4.169 and 0.000 and for BasinG3 3.542 and 0.000. In all cases the
level of significance is smaller than 0.05, so for each variable, there is enough
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero.
From the slopes we can see that the relationship between Min Rate and BasinG3
is positive.
The R Square = 0.120 suggest that 12% of the variability in Percent Reduction
TSS, can be explained by the variables of the model.
Chapter 4
Summary of Findings and Policy
Recommendations
4.1 Summary of Findings
The conclusions of this study are derived from the studies revised in the literature
review, in particular from the analysis of the studies conducted in Section 1.2 and
Section 2.4, as well as from the Section 3.2 and 3.3.
Regarding the first question of study:
Does the performance of the pollution charge program in Colombia undermine the
notion that economic instruments are not feasible in developing countries?
It was found that the success of the Colombian case contradicts the assumption
of the economic theory because:
• Unfavorable circumstances, faced by developing countries when implementing
economic-base mechanisms ( described in Section 1.2), were present in the
Colombian water pollution charge program. For example resistance by some
water companies and low collection rates were present as pointed out by schol-
ars and policy makers 2.4.
• Even though, the water pollution program was not successful across all regional
environmental agencies in Colombia, there are regional environmental agencies
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where the program was successful in reducing pollution levels. Successful cases
are pointed out by researchers and policy making organizations (e.g. CVC,
CORNARE and CARDER). As shown in this study, water pollution charge
program seems to perform differently along CARs. In particular, it is shown
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3) that for BOD levels reduction , CHOCO had a poor per-
formance and CORNARE had a good performance (See Table B). On the other
hand, reducing TSS levels, CHOCO performs slightly better than CORNARE
(See Table C).
• The success of the water program in some environmental agencies is related to
the overcoming of the unfavorable circumstances by such agencies, as addressed
in Section 2.4. Moreover, the discharge fee program helped to mitigate some
of those unfavorable circumstances. For instance colombian water pollution
fee program permitted the improvement and development of information about
water resources and generated financial resources for further environmental in-
vestment (see Section 2.4).
Related to the second question:
Which factors determine the performance of the water pollution charge program across
regional environmental agencies in Colombia?
It was found that the factors that seem to explain the differences in performance
of water pollution charge program are related to social, economic and institutional
aspects, such as:
1. For BOD levels: economic subactivity, percent amount collected by the envi-
ronmental agency, basin group, program cost and GDP.
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2. For TSS levels: min rate, fee invoiced, percent collected and basin group.
The influence of these factors is further analyzed below.
• In both the regression model for classification in reduction of BOD groups and
the decision tree, the economic subactivity group 1, the utility companies and
the slaughter houses, is significant. It can be seen in both models that most of
the individuals on this group present an increase on BOD levels.
• The regressions models show that the basin groups 1 and 3 for BOD and group 3
for the TSS, are significant explaining the change on water pollution levels. This
is an important point to explore in future studies, explaining which particular
aspects of these basins are related to such significance.
• As noted by Huber et al. (1999:23), although the institutional rationalization
process has progressed to accommodate both inter-sectorial and decentralized
authorities, institutional fragility remains a well-recognized key barrier to suc-
cessful governmental management in the region. It is important to recognize
that Economic instruments are not a substitute for weak institutions or for
Command and Control; some regulatory elements are inevitably required and a
strong institutional base is a prerequisite to implement Economic Instruments.
This is reflected in the regression where Percent Amount Collected is significant
explaining the changes in BOD and TSS levels. The Percent Amount Collected
not only reflects the capacity of the regional environmental agency to collect the
fee but also reflects the environmental agency’s strength on its relationship with
the polluters and its capacity to get funding for new environmental investments.
• According to the environmental economic theory, market-oriented instruments
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allow polluters and resource users to find their own best responses to the pol-
lution restrictions, and therefore result in lower private costs than other ap-
proaches. In developing countries, institutional support plays an important
role in the success of market oriented mechanisms because the market does not
work perfectly. This is reflected in the data analysis. One of the findings was
that when the program cost increased, the levels of BOD decreased. The cost
of the program reflects the budget environmental agencies designate for the wa-
ter pollution charge program. Also, as most of the studies pointed out, in the
Colombian case Municipalities were one of the sectors that did not comply with
the reduction goal. This was mainly a consequence of two reasons: they do not
have resources to build waste water treatment facilities, or they do not pay the
fees which they perceive as extra cost.
• It is worth to point out that for BOD, the economic variables Program Cost and
GDP show a very different behavior in the regression analysis and the decision
tree analysis. While in the regression analysis they are not significant within
the 0.05 level, in the tree decision analysis they present the highest variable
importance score, i.e. they are the variables that are most used to classify
the polluters. This hints that these two economic variables are important in a
fashion not captured by the linear regression.
• It was also found that there is a positive correlation between the Min Rate
increase and the decrease of pollution levels for BOD as well as TSS. This
relationship agrees with the predictions of economic theory according to which
if the minimum rate is well set this variable should have a high significance
explaining water pollution reduction. What was found in the BOD regression
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models is that this variable is not significant to explain changes in percent
reduction or to determine the group of BOD reduction. From the point of view
of the economic theory it can be said that it is likely that the fee is too low to
produce changes in BOD-pollution behavior. On the other hand, in the TSS
regression models as well as in the decision tree analysis, Min Rate is significant,
both, to explain changes in percent reduction and to determine the group of TSS
reduction. These results suggest that the minimum rate is well set to reduce
levels of TSS.
In sum, the results presented highlight that the success of discharge fee as an
economic mechanism in a developing country should be analyzed not only at national
level but also at regional, basin and polluter level.
In this frame, the economic theory can be reconciliated with the findings of this
study by qualifying the different regional environmental agencies in Colombia as “de-
veloped” and “developing”. Changing the frame of analysis from the country level
to regional agencies level, it can be said that “developing” agencies present unfa-
vorable circumstances that limit their effectiveness for the application of economic
instruments.
Another important finding, deduced from the experience of realizing this study, is
that even though the discharge fee program permitted improvement and development
of information about water resources, there is a long way of improvement in this area.
The semestral reports each environmental agency has to present to the Ministry of
the environment work as a mechanism to create, standardize and update data bases.
However, there is a low percentage of regional environmental agencies with good -
meaning complete, consistent, and available- information data sets about the pollution
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charge program, as noticed for the data base of this study. The problems presented
with the data also reflect lack of systematic and qualified monitoring and feedback by
the environmental agencies, the governmental auditorial entities and the public. This
poor data and lack of control agree with the assumption of the economic theory about
unfavorable circumstances presented in developing countries as discussed in Section
1.2.
4.2 Policy Recommendations
The policy recommendations, pointed out in this study, aim to improve the effective-
ness of Pollution Charge Program in Colombia. These recommendations could also
serve the increasing number of developing countries where economic instruments are
at the top of the agenda of the environmental management sector.
From the conclusions obtained in this study the following policy recommendations
for water pollution control are suggested.
The Colombian Ministry of Environment in conjunction with the regional envi-
ronmental agencies must:
• Seek policies focused in improving the institutional capacity of (weak) envi-
ronmental agencies. One possibility would be to evaluate and re-enforce the
technical assistance program, conducted by the Ministry of Environment and
successful CARs to assist those least successful CARs in the program’s imple-
mentation.
• Include local factors in the water pollution control policy. Given that the ef-
fectiveness of the program to reduce pollution levels depends on local factors
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such as economic characteristics of the region, activities of polluters and char-
acteristics of basins; policies focusing in these local factors may help improve
the program performance. It can be achieved by using alternative pollution
control mechanisms, such as public disclosure (see (Sterner, 2003:122)), as a
complement to water pollution charge program in order to target most signifi-
cant groups of polluters and to include special characteristics of certain basins.
• Develop policies aiming to improve quality and availability of information. Even
though, there has been improvement and development of information about
water resources the matter needs to improve. One option is to make periodical
public reports of the program’s performance (e.g publishing the reports each
CAR presents to the ministry of the environment in the ministry web page or
CARs web page). Also, in order to improve readily available information, it is
necessary to improve and enforce data standardization across CARs. In this
case is also important to offer technical capacitation about importance and use
of the appropriate software to get such standardization.
• Support the municipalities with technical and/or financial resources. Munici-
palities were one of the sectors that did not comply with the reduction goals.
One of the reasons for this was their lack of resources to build waste water
treatment facilities. If the regional environmental agencies help them, directly
or indirectly, to fund the construction of such facilities, the Municipalities will
start reducing pollution and will be more motivated to look for alternative
ways to fund projects related to water pollution reduction, such as the treat-
ment plants. One of the ways in which the environmental agencies can help
the municipalities to get funding is to instruct and guide them in the search of
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funding from other national and international entities.
• Take a lead role in cultivating the culture of public participation in environmen-
tal issues such as reduction of water pollution. The water pollution program
took a step forward in public participation through the goal negotiation process,
that included boards of directors of each CAR or AAU, as well as representatives
of national and local governments, key productive sectors, and environmental
nongovernmental organizations in the reduction goal setting. But, more poli-
cies aimed to create participation mechanisms for the community in general
are needed. One option is to develop a report of regional indicators of sus-
tainability. This report can work as an assessment of regional sustainability
trends including water pollution. The purpose will be to help guide and in-
spire action for positive change through the regions. Its findings would serve as
foundation for strategic thinking, priority setting, and action by policy makers,
community leaders as well as the general public. The public participation can
improve the efficacy of the pollution control program because moral and social
responsibilities of polluters will gain weight trough a better informed and more
participating public.
Appendix A
Discharge Fee Formulae
Discharge Fee Formulae in Decree 901 of 1997
Source: Blackman (2005:27-28)
Decree 901 of 1997 regulates Law 99 provisions on retributive fees for water dis-
charges. It mandates that the monthly fee for pollutant j (BOD5 or TSS), TRj, is
calculated as
TRj = Trj × Ccj × T
where
• Trj = regional adjustment for quantity total discharges of pollutant j by all
sources ($ /kg),
• Ccj = daily pollution load of the substance (kg/day), and
• T = number of days of discharge.
Furthermore, Cc is calculated as
Cc = Q× C × 0.0864× (t/24),
where
• Qj = average flow (l/s),
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• Cj = concentration of the contaminating substance (mg/l),
• 0.0864 = unit conversion factor, and
• t = hours per day of discharges (h).
And Trj is calculated as
Trj = Tmj × Fr,
where
• Tmj = minimum rate ($ /kg) and
• Frj = regional factor.
The minimum rate Tmj is established annually by MMA. The minimum regional fac-
tor is equal to 1. It increases by 0.5 each semester (six months) until a preestablished
target for total reductions of discharges by all sources is meet.
Appendix B
BOD Model
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics Dependent Variables
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Percent Reduction BOD 255 -1.315 0.995 0.183 0.448
Reduction BOD Group 251 -1.000 1.000 0.183 0.736
Valid N (listwise) 251
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics Independent Interval/ratio Variables
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Invoice BOD 255 0.000 0.560 0.018 0.060
Total Invoice 255 0.000 0.663 0.024 0.077
Amount Collected 255 0.000 0.302 0.009 0.033
min rate BOD 255 39.500 66.950 52.966 8.732
Reg Factor 255 1.500 5.500 5.251 0.798
Num Periods 255 1.000 10.000 7.749 3.167
Prog Cost 255 0.019 0.146 0.103 0.044
GDP 255 0.736 2.938 1.840 0.582
Perc Collected 255 0.000 1.000 0.335 0.313
Valid N (listwise) 255
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Table B.3: Frequency Statistics for Independent Nominal Variables
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Env Agency
Valid CORNARE 191 74.9 74.9 74.9
CHOCO 52 20.4 20.4 95.3
CORALINA 12 4.7 4.7 100.0
Total 255 100.0 100.0
Econ Activity
Valid Agroindustry 104 40.8 40.8 40.8
Industry 95 37.3 37.3 78.0
Domestic 56 22.0 22.0 100.0
Total 255 100.0 100.0
EconSubAct Group
Valid 1.00 33 12.9 13.3 13.3
2.00 77 30.2 30.9 44.2
3.00 77 30.2 30.9 75.1
4.00 62 24.3 24.9 100.0
Total 249 97.6 100.0
Missing System 6 2.4
Total 255 100.0
Basin Group
Valid 1.00 18 7.1 7.6 7.6
2.00 27 10.6 11.4 19.0
3.00 150 58.8 63.3 82.3
4.00 42 16.5 17.7 100.0
Total 237 92.9 100.0
Missing System 18 7.1
Total 255 100.0
Table B.4: Oneway ANOVA
ANOVA Basin
Percent Reduction BOD
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 8.789 10 0.879 4.824 0.000
Within Groups 41.173 226 0.182
Total 49.961 236
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ANOVA Econ Subactivity
Percent Reduction BOD
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 8.102 9 0.900 4.666 0.000
Within Groups 49.775 258 0.193
Total 57.877 267
Table B.5: Pearson Correlation
Percent Reduction BOD Reduction BOD Group
Pearson Sig. Pearson Sig.
Correlation (2-tailed) N Correlation (2-tailed) N
% Reduction BOD 1.000 255 0.844∗∗ 0.000 251
Reduc. BOD Group 0.844∗∗ 0.000 251 1.000 251
Invoice BOD 0.014 0.828 255 0.030 0.636 251
Total Invoice 0.011 0.866 255 0.003 0.961 251
Amount Collected 0.073 0.248 255 0.139∗ 0.028 251
min rate BOD 0.157∗ 0.012 255 0.321∗∗ 0.000 251
Reg Factor -0.057 0.366 255 -0.050 0.433 251
Num Periods 0.098 0.120 255 0.032 0.615 251
Prog Cost 0.301∗∗ 0.000 255 0.483∗∗ 0.000 251
GDP 0.331∗∗ 0.000 255 0.467∗∗ 0.000 251
Perc Collected 0.388∗∗ 0.000 255 0.486∗∗ 0.000 251
CORNARE 0.264∗∗ 0.000 255 0.469∗∗ 0.000 251
CHOCO -0.330∗∗ 0.000 255 -0.502∗∗ 0.000 251
Agroindustry 0.008 0.894 255 0.012 0.845 251
Industry 0.070 0.267 255 0.188∗∗ 0.003 251
Domestic -0.091 0.146 255 -0.236∗∗ 0.000 251
EconSubActG1 -0.316∗∗ 0.000 249 -0.598∗∗ 0.000 246
EconSubActG2 0.037 0.559 249 0.107 0.095 246
EconSubActG3 0.089 0.162 249 0.137∗∗ 0.032 246
EconSubActG4 0.113 0.075 249 0.211∗∗ 0.001 246
BasinG1 0.213∗∗ 0.001 237 0.225∗∗ 0.001 233
BasinG2 -0.208∗∗ 0.001 237 -0.267∗∗ 0.000 233
BasinG3 0.239∗∗ 0.000 237 0.356∗∗ 0.000 233
BasinG4 -0.276∗∗ 0.000 237 -0.382∗∗ 0.000 233
∗∗ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
∗ Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table B.6: Regression Coefficients and Model Summary for Percent Reduction BOD
Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
Model 1
(Constant) -0.071 0.492 -0.144 0.886
Invoice BOD -0.472 0.507 -0.064 -0.931 0.353
Reg Factor -0.073 0.068 -0.094 -1.073 0.284
Num Periods 0.024 0.015 0.148 1.597 0.112
GDP -0.003 0.119 -0.004 -0.023 0.982
Perc Collected 0.255 0.154 0.172 1.653 0.100
Agroindustry -0.182 0.142 -0.192 -1.281 0.202
Domestic -0.037 0.131 -0.034 -0.282 0.778
EconSubActG1 0.116 0.231 0.088 0.503 0.615
EconSubActG2 0.233 0.138 0.236 1.686 0.093
EconSubActG3 0.264 0.146 0.257 1.801 0.073
BasinG1 0.437 0.217 0.252 2.014 0.045
BasinG2 -0.012 0.152 -0.008 -0.081 0.936
BasinG3 0.417 0.192 0.437 2.176 0.031
Model 11
(Constant) -0.142 0.052 -2.731 0.007
Perc Collected 0.380 0.097 0.256 3.934 0.000
BasinG1 0.416 0.119 0.240 3.482 0.001
BasinG3 0.264 0.064 0.277 4.127 0.000
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1a 0.507 0.257 0.213 0.411052
11b 0.467 0.218 0.208 0.412319
a. Predictors: (Constant), BasinG3, Invoice BOD , Perc Collected, Reg Factor,
EconSubActG2, BasinG2, Agroindustry, Num Periods, Domestic, EconSubActG3,
BasinG1, GDP, EconSubActG1
b. Predictors: (Constant), BasinG3, Perc Collected, BasinG1
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Table B.7: Regression Coefficients and Model Summary for Reduction BOD Group
Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
Model 1
(Constant) -0.081 0.680 -0.119 0.905
Invoice BOD 0.091 0.695 0.008 0.131 0.896
Reg Factor -0.078 0.093 -0.062 -0.841 0.401
Num Periods 0.027 0.021 0.101 1.287 0.200
GDP 0.000 0.164 0.000 -0.003 0.998
Perc Collected 0.504 0.213 0.208 2.369 0.019
Agroindustry -0.198 0.198 -0.127 -1.003 0.317
Domestic -0.101 0.188 -0.056 -0.535 0.593
EconSubActG1 -0.645 0.326 -0.297 -1.981 0.049
EconSubActG2 0.216 0.195 0.132 1.107 0.269
EconSubActG3 0.268 0.205 0.159 1.306 0.193
BasinG1 0.581 0.298 0.205 1.951 0.052
BasinG2 0.049 0.208 0.021 0.237 0.813
BasinG3 0.456 0.264 0.290 1.727 0.086
Model 10
(Constant) -0.099 0.098 -1.012 0.313
Perc Collected 0.629 0.135 0.259 4.641 0.000
EconSubActG1 -0.893 0.135 -0.411 -6.631 0.000
BasinG1 0.495 0.167 0.175 2.964 0.003
BasinG3 0.247 0.103 0.157 2.386 0.018
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1a 0.699 0.488 0.458 0.56254
10b 0.690 0.476 0.467 0.55784
a. Predictors: (Constant), BasinG3, Invoice BOD , Perc Collected, Reg Factor,
EconSubActG2, BasinG2, Agroindustry, Num Periods, Domestic, EconSubActG3,
BasinG1, GDP, EconSubActG1
b. Predictors: (Constant), BasinG3, Perc Collected, BasinG1, EconSubActG1
Appendix C
TSS Model
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics Dependent Variables
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Percent Reduction TSS 276 -1.259 0.997 0.226 0.466
Reduction TSS Group 271 -1.000 1.000 0.221 0.747
Valid N (listwise) 271
Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics Independent Interval/ratio Variables
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Invoice TSS 276 0.000 0.242 0.006 0.022
Total Invoice 255 0.000 0.663 0.024 0.077
Amount Collected 255 0.000 0.302 0.009 0.033
min rate TSS 276 16.900 28.670 22.723 3.609
Reg Factor 255 1.500 5.500 5.251 0.798
Num Periods 255 1.000 10.000 7.749 3.167
Prog Cost 255 0.019 0.146 0.103 0.044
GDP 255 0.736 2.938 1.840 0.582
Perc Collected 255 0.000 1.000 0.335 0.313
Valid N (listwise) 255
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Table C.3: Frequency Statistics for Independent Nominal Variables
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Env Agency
Valid CORNARE 191 61.8 74.9 74.9
CHOCO 52 16.8 20.4 95.3
CORALINA 12 3.9 4.7 100.0
Total 255 82.5 100.0
Missing System 54 17.5
Total 309 100.0
Econ Activity
Valid Agroindustry 104 33.7 40.8 40.8
Industry 95 30.7 37.3 78.0
Domestic 56 18.1 22.0 100.0
Total 255 82.5 100.0
Missing System 54 17.5
Total 309 100.0
EconSubAct Group
Valid 1 23 7.4 8.6 8.6
2 84 27.2 31.3 39.9
3 98 31.7 36.6 76.5
4 63 20.4 23.5 100.0
Total 268 86.7 100.0
Missing System 41 13.3
Total 309 100.0
Basin Group
Valid 1 24 7.8 10.1 10.1
2 37 12.0 15.6 25.7
3 26 8.4 11.0 36.7
4 150 48.5 63.3 100.0
Total 237 76.7 100.0
Missing System 72 23.3
Total 309 100.0
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Table C.4: Oneway ANOVA
Percent Reduction TSS ANOVA Basin
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.817 10 0.282 1.321 0.220
Within Groups 48.189 226 0.213
Total 51.005 236
ANOVA Econ Subactivity
Percent Reduction TSS
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.793 9 0.310 1.424 0.178
Within Groups 56.238 258 0.218
Total 59.031 267
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Table C.5: Pearson Correlation
Percent Reduction TSS Reduction TSS Group
Pearson Sig. Pearson Sig.
Correlation (2-tailed) N Correlation (2-tailed) N
% Reduction TSS 1.000 276 0.857∗∗ 0.000 271
Reduc. TSS Group 0.857∗∗ 0.000 271 1.000 271
Invoice TSS -0.069 0.255 276 -0.140∗ 0.022 271
Total Invoice -0.086 0.173 255 -0.065 0.306 250
Amount Collected -0.064 0.311 255 -0.046 0.466 250
min rate TSS 0.178∗∗ 0.003 276 0.329∗∗ 0.000 271
Reg Factor -0.040 0.520 255 -0.037 0.556 250
Num Periods 0.050 0.426 255 -0.018 0.778 250
Prog Cost -0.069 0.273 255 -0.069 0.276 250
GDP -0.037 0.556 255 -0.041 0.519 250
Perc Collected 0.073 0.243 255 -0.003 0.959 250
CORNARE -0.089 0.155 255 -0.114 0.071 250
CHOCO 0.059 0.347 255 0.071 0.262 250
Agroindustry 0.022 0.723 255 0.014 0.822 250
Industry -0.034 0.589 255 -0.088 0.168 250
Domestic 0.013 0.834 255 0.086 0.176 250
EconSubActG1TSS 0.078 0.204 268 0.051 0.413 263
EconSubActG2TSS 0.061 0.318 268 0.015 0.809 263
EconSubActG3TSS -0.065 0.291 268 -0.022 0.723 263
EconSubActG4TSS -0.045 0.464 268 -0.025 0.684 263
BasinG1TSS -0.064 0.325 237 -0.043 0.512 233
BasinG2TSS 0.002 0.978 237 -0.005 0.946 233
BasinG3TSS 0.212∗∗ 0.001 237 0.235∗∗ 0.000 233
BasinG4TSS -0.098 0.131 237 -0.123 0.061 233
∗∗ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
∗ Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table C.6: Regression Coefficients and Model Summary for Percent Reduction TSS
Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
Model 1
(Constant) 0.148 0.562 0.263 0.793
min rate TSS 0.019 0.009 0.145 2.157 0.032
Invoice TSS -0.847 1.314 -0.042 -0.644 0.520
Total Invoice -0.775 0.868 -0.133 -0.892 0.373
Amount Collected 0.384 1.990 0.029 0.193 0.847
Reg Factor -0.020 0.062 -0.026 -0.331 0.741
Num Periods -0.009 0.017 -0.055 -0.500 0.618
Prog Cost -2.479 1.695 -0.237 -1.463 0.145
Perc Collected 0.344 0.169 0.228 2.030 0.044
Agroindustry -0.001 0.110 -0.002 -0.014 0.989
Industry -0.060 0.100 -0.062 -0.598 0.550
BasinG1TSS -0.175 0.144 -0.114 -1.212 0.227
BasinG2TSS -0.089 0.156 -0.069 -0.568 0.571
BasinG3TSS 0.176 0.150 0.117 1.176 0.241
EconSubActG1TSS 0.168 0.135 0.088 1.244 0.215
EconSubActG2TSS 0.043 0.088 0.042 0.483 0.630
EconSubActG3TSS -0.052 0.082 -0.054 -0.630 0.529
Model 14
(Constant) -0.356 0.206 -1.724 0.086
min rate TSS 0.021 0.009 0.159 2.455 0.015
Perc Collected 0.187 0.098 0.124 1.914 0.057
BasinG3TSS 0.299 0.096 0.199 3.101 0.002
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1a 0.358 0.128 0.063 0.453
14b 0.288 0.083 0.071 0.451
a. Predictors: (Constant), EconSubActG3TSS, Invoice TSS, Reg Factor, Bas-
inG1TSS, Perc Collected, Total Invoice , min rate TSS, EconSubActG1TSS, In-
dustry, BasinG3TSS, BasinG2TSS, Num Periods, EconSubActG2TSS, Agroindustry,
Amount Collected, Prog Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), Perc Collected, min rate TSS, BasinG3TSS
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Table C.7: Regression Coefficients and Model Summary for Reduction TSS Group
Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
Model 1
(Constant) 0.148 0.562 0.263 0.793
min rate TSS 0.019 0.009 0.145 2.157 0.032
Invoice TSS -0.847 1.314 -0.042 -0.644 0.520
Total Invoice -0.775 0.868 -0.133 -0.892 0.373
Amount Collected 0.384 1.990 0.029 0.193 0.847
Reg Factor -0.020 0.062 -0.026 -0.331 0.741
Num Periods -0.009 0.017 -0.055 -0.500 0.618
Prog Cost -2.479 1.695 -0.237 -1.463 0.145
Perc Collected 0.344 0.169 0.228 2.030 0.044
Agroindustry -0.001 0.110 -0.002 -0.014 0.989
Industry -0.060 0.100 -0.062 -0.598 0.550
BasinG1TSS -0.175 0.144 -0.114 -1.212 0.227
BasinG2TSS -0.089 0.156 -0.069 -0.568 0.571
BasinG3TSS 0.176 0.150 0.117 1.176 0.241
EconSubActG1TSS 0.168 0.135 0.088 1.244 0.215
EconSubActG2TSS 0.043 0.088 0.042 0.483 0.630
EconSubActG3TSS -0.052 0.082 -0.054 -0.630 0.529
Model 14
(Constant) -0.356 0.206 -1.724 0.086
min rate TSS 0.021 0.009 0.159 2.455 0.015
Perc Collected 0.187 0.098 0.124 1.914 0.057
BasinG3TSS 0.299 0.096 0.199 3.101 0.002
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1a 0.412 0.170 0.107 0.682
15b 0.357 0.127 0.120 0.677
a. Predictors: (Constant), EconSubActG3TSS, Invoice TSS, Perc Collected, Bas-
inG1TSS, Reg Factor, Total Invoice , min rate TSS, EconSubActG1TSS, Indus-
try, BasinG3TSS, BasinG2TSS, Num Periods, EconSubActG2TSS, Agroindustry,
Amount Collected, Prog Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), min rate TSS, BasinG3TSS
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